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The Clean Air Act, like many federal environmental statutes, relies upon the
cooperation of state environmental agencies for its execution and enforcement.
If states do not cooperate, the Clean Air Act obligates the federal government to
regulate in their stead as well as to impose potentially draconian sanctions.
Specifically, the Act calls for the revocation of federal highway funds in
noncooperative states. There are reasons to suspect that the Clean Air Act’s
sanction regime is unconstitutional, particularly in the wake of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, which enforced a limit on the
federal government’s ability to induce states to cooperate with federal programs.
Most significantly, NFIB held that conditioning receipt of federal Medicaid
funds on a state’s willingness to participate in a dramatic expansion of the
program was unconstitutionally coercive. Combined with the Court’s prior
holding in South Dakota v. Dole, NFIB raises questions about the
constitutionality of the Clean Air Act’s highway fund sanctions and may open the
door to challenges to other portions of the Act as well.
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INTRODUCTION
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is the nation’s most far-reaching federal
environmental law. It is a model of “cooperative federalism” 1 and a source of
persistent federal-state conflict.2 Like many federal environmental laws, the
CAA relies upon the cooperation of state environmental agencies for its
1. “[C]ooperative federalism” is an arrangement where states may regulate according to federal
standards as an alternative to direct federal regulation. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167
(1992).
2. States routinely challenge CAA provisions and implementing regulations in federal court. See,
e.g., Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2016) (challenging Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) disapproval of regional haze plans); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705–06 (2015)
(challenging the regulation of mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants); Utah v. EPA, 765 F.3d
1257, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014) (challenging EPA’s partial rejection of state implementation plan);
North Dakota v. EPA, 730 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 2013) (challenging EPA’s partial rejection of state
implementation plan); Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (challenging
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) revisions); Oklahoma v. EPA, 723 F.3d 1201,
1204 (10th Cir. 2013) (challenging EPA’s rejection of Oklahoma’s emission control plan); Texas v. EPA,
726 F.3d 180, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (challenging EPA’s rules on greenhouse gas emission permits); Texas
v. EPA, 690 F.3d 670, 673–74 (5th Cir. 2012) (challenging EPA’s rejection of state implementation plan);
North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh’g in part granted, 550 F.3d 1176
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (challenging the Clean Air Interstate Rule); New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (challenging the hazardous air pollutant regulations); New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880,
883–84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging EPA’s New Source Review regulations); New York v. EPA, 413
F.3d 3, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (challenging EPA’s implementation of New Source Review program); West
Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (challenging the regulations governing nitrogen
oxide emissions); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (challenging EPA rules
on CAA permits on Indian lands); see also John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air
Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1209–10 (1995).
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execution and enforcement. It operates on the expectation that state officials will
develop implementation plans, issue permits, and enforce emission limitations.
If states do not cooperate, the CAA obligates the federal government to regulate
in their stead. Perhaps more significantly, the CAA also authorizes (and in some
cases, requires) the imposition of sanctions on noncooperating states. When
states fail to adopt adequate plans for meeting federal air quality standards, the
CAA authorizes the imposition of more stringent regulatory requirements and
the revocation of federal highway funds.
Since the CAA’s enactment, states have chafed against the CAA.3 In the
1970s, states successfully opposed efforts to force their compliance with the
CAA.4 Subsequent efforts to obtain relief from the CAA’s inducements have
been unavailing—but that could change. As federal air quality standards become
more stringent and more difficult for states to meet, states are more likely to
challenge the constitutionality of the sanctions for noncompliance. More
significantly, under National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
(NFIB),5 states have a new set of arguments against the CAA regime, including
an argument that the most severe sanctions for noncompliance are
unconstitutional.
In NFIB the Court reaffirmed that Congress may not force states to
implement federal programs. Specifically, the Court concluded that Congress
sought to coerce states into accepting a dramatic expansion of the federal
Medicaid program by threatening to withhold funding for the pre-existing
Medicaid program.6 This use of conditional spending, seven Justices concluded,
crossed the line from permissible inducement to unconstitutional coercion.7 In
the process, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution creates a federal
government of limited and enumerated powers,8 and that the federal

3. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in
Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1548–49 (1996) (discussing
local resistance to CAA implementation); Jackson B. Battle, Transportation Controls Under the Clean
Air Act—An Experience in (Un)cooperative Federalism, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1980)
(describing conflict over CAA implementation); see also supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
4. See infra notes 91–97 and sources cited therein.
5. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6. Id. at 2603–04; id at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
7. The seven Justices were Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan on this
point, and the four dissenting Justices, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 2603–04 (majority
opinion); id. at 2659–61(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2577 (majority opinion) (“The Federal Government is acknowledged by all to be one of
enumerated powers. . . . The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because the
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated. . . . [T]he Federal Government can exercise only the
powers granted to it.” (internal quotations omitted)). On NFIB’s embrace and embodiment of this
principle, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Conflict of Visions in NFIB v. Sebelius, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 937, 969
(2014).
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government’s so-called spending power9 is subject to judicially enforceable
limits.10
The Supreme Court previously articulated limits on the use of conditional
spending in South Dakota v. Dole.11 This decision purported to set outer limits
on the extent of Congress’s spending power, but these limits were never
enforced.12 Dole itself found that Congress acted within the scope of its spending
power and, until NFIB, the Court had never found a congressional spending
condition unconstitutional.13 As one might expect, lower courts were anything
but eager to get ahead of the Court on this front.14 With little guidance on how
to apply Dole’s test, there was little reason for lower courts—or Congress—to
take the Dole limits seriously.15

9. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04. The existence of federal power to expend funds is well
established, but there is some academic debate as to the source of this power, such as whether it is tied to
the specific enumeration of powers in Article I, section 8. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The New
Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (“It is
clear that the Constitution gives Congress the power to raise, and to spend, money” even though “there
really is no ‘Spending Clause.’”); see also Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343,
1348 (1988); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 19–20 (1994); Jeffrey T. Renz,
What Spending Clause? (Or, the President’s Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton,
Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 81, 86–88 (1999).
10. A majority of the Court also concluded that Congress could not enact a minimum coverage
provision requiring all individuals present in the country to obtain health insurance, also known as the
“individual mandate,” under the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause. This provision was
upheld as a permissible exercise of the taxing power. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Commerce Clause);
id. at 2593 (Necessary and Proper Clause); id. at 2600 (taxing power).
11. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
12. With one exception, lower courts that applied the Dole test routinely upheld conditional
spending statutes against constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 122 (4th
Cir. 2006) (rejecting conditional spending challenge to Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 590 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting conditional spending challenge to
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act); Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374
F.3d 1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting conditional spending challenge to Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Act); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting conditional
spending challenge to Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act); Nevada v.
Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 446–47 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting conditional spending challenge to speed limit
requirement). The one exception was Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding a successful conditional spending challenge to Department of
Education’s implementation of Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act).
13. See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the New Meaning of Commandeering,
91 N.C. L. REV. 811, 832 (2013) (noting NFIB “was the first in United States history to invalidate a federal
spending provision on the ground that it coerced the states”).
14. In the five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, invalidating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act for exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause, only one federal appellate
court declared a federal law unconstitutional on equivalent grounds. After the Supreme Court found
another law to have exceeded the scope of the Commerce Power in United States v. Morrison, however,
lower courts began to apply greater scrutiny in commerce cases. See Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?
Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 758, 761–62 (2005).
15. One of the authors nonetheless argued that the CAA’s highway fund sanctions were
constitutionally suspect under the Dole test. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future
of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 448–49 (2005).

Adler Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017 12:55 PM

2016]

IS THE CLEAN AIR ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

675

In NFIB the Court fleshed out what it means for a conditional spending
statute to be unconstitutionally coercive and affirmed that the doctrinal limits
articulated in Dole should be enforced.16 The Court’s willingness to strike down
a portion of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) should
trigger greater scrutiny of statutory provisions utilizing conditional spending to
induce state cooperation with federal policies.17 The CAA is an obvious target
for such litigation.18 It is a continuing source of regulatory obligations and
appears to be one of the statutes most vulnerable to attack, particularly insofar as
the CAA conditions the receipt of federal highway funds on state willingness to
implement various CAA requirements.19 Although several post-NFIB analyses
concluded that NFIB does not threaten the constitutionality of the highway fund
sanction,20 this Article reaches the opposite conclusion. Moreover, although the
CAA’s highway fund sanctions are the most vulnerable, anti-coercion challenges
may be raised against other parts of the statute as well.21
Part I provides a brief survey of the Supreme Court’s anti-coercion
jurisprudence, including the prohibition against commandeering and pre-NFIB
limits on conditional spending. Part II briefly summarizes the framework of
“cooperative federalism” as it has been applied in federal environmental statutes,
including the CAA. Part III details the Supreme Court’s spending power holding
in NFIB and explains how this decision augments and reinforces the Dole limits
on conditional spending. Part IV discusses the potential implications of applying
NFIB and the Dole principles to the CAA’s highway fund sanctions. Part V then
briefly discusses whether NFIB creates the opportunity to label other parts of the
CAA coercive.

16. See Joondeph, supra note 13, at 815 (noting the Court “re-conceptualized what constitutes a
federal command to the states” (emphasis added)).
17. See id. at 815–16 (noting that the NFIB holding “potentially jeopardizes a range of federal
spending programs” and could even extend beyond conditional spending); see also Mitchell N. Berman,
Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2013) (noting conditional spending holding “is apt to have the
most far-reaching consequences beyond health care”).
18. See Ann Carlson, Another (Mostly) Uninformed Post About the Health Care Cases and
Environmental Law, LEGAL PLANET (June 28, 2012), http://legal-planet.org/2012/06/28/another-mostlyuninformed-post-about-the-health-care-cases-and-environmental-law.
19. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 916–20 (2013) (suggesting highway funds under the CAA could be vulnerable
under NFIB).
20. See, e.g., Sarah Buckley, Clean Air Post-Health Care: The Federalism Limits of the Spending
Power and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 101 VA. L. REV. 807, 827 (2015); Erin Ryan, The
Spending Power and Environmental Law after Sebelius, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1003, 1058–59 (2014);
Georgina Jones Suzuki, Note, Clearing the Air Following National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius: The Clean Air Act and the Constitutionality of Highway Sanctions, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2131,
2518 (2013); David Baake, Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No Highway”
Provision Constitutional After NFIB v. Sebelius?, 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 1, 4, 6 (2012), http://harvard
elr.org/?p=887; Jonathan Zasloff, Conditional Spending and the Clean Air Act, LEGAL PLANET (June 28,
2012), http://legal-planet.org/2012/06/28/conditional-spending-and-the-clean-air-act.
21. See infra Part V.
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COERCION, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, AND CONDITIONAL
SPENDING

The federal government has extensive power to enact environmental and
other regulatory measures.22 The federal government also has a range of
measures to induce state cooperation with federal regulatory initiatives. Such
power is not unlimited, however. Although the federal government may seek
state cooperation, it may not coerce state participation in federal programs or
initiatives.
Under existing doctrine, the federal government is precluded from
“commandeering” state governments to implement federal regulatory programs.
The federal government may regulate private firms directly, it may preempt
states from regulating in ways that are contrary to federal policy, and it may even
authorize state regulations that, in the absence of federal legislation, might run
afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The federal government may not,
however, require states to regulate on its behalf.23 As the Supreme Court
explained in New York v. United States: “The Constitution enables the Federal
Government to pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal interests, and it
permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as a means
of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. It does not,
however, authorize Congress simply to direct the States . . . .”24 Chief Justice
Roberts reaffirmed this principle in NFIB, noting Congress may not “conscript
state [agencies] into the national bureaucratic army.” 25
Whether to ensure sufficient disposal capacity for low-level radioactive
waste26 or remedy lead contamination in drinking water,27 the federal
government cannot require state governments to adopt specific policy measures.
State governments remain “sovereign” and cannot be commandeered by the

22. For a general discussion of the federal government’s authority to regulate in the environmental
context and a survey of federalism limitations on such authority, see Adler, supra note 15, at 381–88. For
a broader discussion of the intersection of environmental and constitutional law, see James R. May,
Introduction: The Intersection of Constitutional and Environmental Law, in PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (James R. May ed., 2011).
23. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a federal
law requiring state officers to perform background checks on handgun purchasers); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a federal law requiring states to accept
ownership of waste or regulate according to instructions of Congress).
24. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
25. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 (2012) (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 775 (1982)).
26. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that portions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act Amendments unconstitutionally commandeer state governments).
27. ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating portions of the Lead
Contamination Control Act).
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federal government.28 Articulated by the Supreme Court in clear and
unequivocal terms, the anti-commandeering principle admits no exceptions.29
The inability to commandeer state governments to enact a federally desired
program or regulatory scheme does not leave the federal government powerless
to induce state action or cooperation. To the contrary, the federal government
retains ample authority to encourage state action through the provision of
positive and negative incentives for state action. Both carrots and sticks are
permissible. As the Court further explained in New York:
[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer States the
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having
state law pre-empted by federal regulation. This arrangement . . . has been
termed “a program of cooperative federalism” . . . .30

In effect, the federal government can say to the states, “Regulate X, or we
will do it for you.”
The threat of conditional federal regulation may provide a sufficient
incentive for states to act. Among other things, state policy makers may conclude
that state-level regulation will be more sensitive to local conditions and
preferences. Where the threat of conditional federal regulation by itself is not
sufficient inducement, Congress may combine incentives, simultaneously
offering to fund compliant state programs and threatening to preempt
noncompliant programs, as it did in the CAA.31 Particularly when used in
28. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (noting “State sovereignty is not just an end in itself” and that
dual sovereignty helps ensure “that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives
liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by governments more local and more accountable than a
distant federal bureaucracy”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison)).
29. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“[N]o case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty.”). There is language in Printz that suggests purely ministerial requirements
might be exempt from the anti-commandeering rule, but the federal courts have not, as of yet, found an
attempted commandeering that was sufficiently ministerial to warrant an exception. See id. at 936
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the Court “appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely
ministerial reporting requirements” represent unconstitutional commandeering of state governments).
This may be due, in part, to the fact that relatively few statutes commandeer state governments.
Conditional spending programs, on the other hand, are quite common.
30. New York, 505 U.S. at 167, 173–74 (explaining “where Congress has the authority to regulate
private activity,” Congress may “offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation.”) (citations omitted). The Court had made
this point before. See Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 764–65; see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (“If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that
complies with [federal law] and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the
Federal Government.”); Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting the Supreme Court has
“repeatedly affirm[ed] the constitutionality of federal statutes that allow States to administer federal
programs but provide for direct federal administration if a State chooses not to administer it.”).
31. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686
(1999) (“[W]e have held . . . that Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant
of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and
that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions.”); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579
(noting Congress’s power to tax and spend “gives the Federal Government considerable influence even in
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combination, these incentives “may well induce the States to adopt policies that
the Federal Government itself could not impose.”32
The prospect of federal regulation, in itself, may be insufficient to induce
states to adopt their own regulations. State regulation may be more attuned to
local needs and priorities, but it can be costly as well. As a consequence, some
states may prefer not to cooperate in the imposition of regulatory burdens on
local constituencies, even if only to avoid being held responsible for the costs of
such regulations. States may also believe that leaving implementation and
enforcement in federal hands may impede the imposition of regulatory
requirements because of resource and other constraints.33
Where states are reluctant to implement federal regulatory requirements, the
most straightforward way to encourage states to implement the desired
regulatory programs is to pay them.34 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, “the
power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution.”35 Thus, Congress may offer states financial support to enact
policies that Congress could not enact itself. Such financial inducement is often
enough to spur state policy makers into action. Such funding can serve to
multiply state investments in a given field, as well as to provide political benefits
to state policy makers.36 Imposing conditions on the receipt of such funding can

areas where it cannot directly regulate”). For a discussion of the use of conditional spending under the
CAA, see infra Part II.
32. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
33. It should be noted that state resistance to federal policy can occur both inside and outside the
cooperative federalism model. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
34. As Professor Roderick Hills notes, “[t]he federal government can purchase the services of state
and local governments whenever it is cost-effective to do so; it has no more need to conscript such services
than it has to conscript the services of secretaries, FBI agents, janitors, or Supreme Court Justices.”
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 819 (1998).
35. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936); see Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41
(1937) (affirming Congress’s power to determine when spending serves the “general welfare”). Although
this question is settled as a matter of constitutional doctrine, prior to Butler there was extensive debate as
to whether the Constitution afforded Congress the power to spend moneys for purposes other than those
expressly identified in the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton, for one, argued that the federal power to
raise and spend money was “plenary” and “indefinite.” See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON
MANUFACTURES (1791), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 446–47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987). James Madison, on the other hand, feared that such a broad construction of the
spending power would produce a “general power of legislation, instead of the defined and limited one”
otherwise provided for in the Constitution. See 30 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES 212 (1817); see also John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General
Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001) (defending a narrower construction of the spending power);
Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original
Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (same); but see Engdahl, supra note 9, at 5 (“No one today
candidly denies that Hamilton’s view of the spending power was correct.”).
36. See Ilya Somin, Closing Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of
Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 484 (2002) (“While state governments have
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also ensure that state policies are implemented consistent with federal
objectives.37
The power to offer conditional federal funding is quite expansive, but it is
also subject to limits. In United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court embraced a
capacious understanding of the “general welfare” Congress may pursue through
federal spending, but it also constrained Congress’s ability to use financial
inducements “to regulate and control” matters “beyond the powers delegated to
the federal government,”38 a category of matters far more limited when Butler
was decided in 1936 than it is today.39
Since Butler, the Court has loosened its restraints on the scope of federal
power, but also reaffirmed that the power to impose conditions accompanying
federal funds is limited so as to ensure that such power is not used to circumvent
other structural limits on federal power.40 Most notably, in South Dakota v. Dole,
the Supreme Court identified a set of restraints upon Congress’s use of
conditional federal spending.41
The Dole test consists of four requirements. First, the appropriation of funds
must be for the “general welfare” and not for a narrow special interest. 42 In
making this determination, however, courts should “defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress.”43 Second, there can be no independent constitutional bar
to the condition imposed upon the federal spending.44 In other words, Congress
may not seek to use the spending power to induce states to engage in conduct
that would otherwise be unconstitutional. These first two requirements are easy
to meet and are rarely issues in conditional spending cases.
The third requirement is that any conditions imposed upon the federal funds
must be clear and unambiguous.45 Recipients of federal funds must have notice
of any conditions with which they must comply, and the scope of their

strong political incentives to resist ordinary federal legislation that inhibits their authority, they have
incentives to accept and even lobby for conditional federal grants.”).
37. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (noting permissibility of imposing
conditions on the receipt of federal funds to achieve “broad policy objectives”); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Congress may “further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of
federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.”).
38. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
39. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The error in Butler was not the Court’s
conclusion that the Act was essentially regulatory, but rather its crabbed view of the extent of Congress’
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.”).
40. For a discussion of the threat an unrestrained spending power poses to other, federalism-based
limits on federal power, see Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 502–04 (2003); Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP.
L. REV. 195, 195 (2001); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after
Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 843, 857 (2000).
41. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
42. Id. at 207.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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obligation.46 As the Court noted in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending
power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms
of the ‘contract.’”47 States are not bound to comply with conditions that were not
made clear when the funds were accepted.
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the conditions imposed must be
related to the federal interest that the exercise of the spending power is itself
supposed to advance.48 As the Court further explained in New York, the
“conditions must . . . bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal
spending, otherwise, of course the spending power could render academic the
Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal authority.” 49 Thus, in upholding
the spending condition challenged in Dole, the Court observed that “the
condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the main purposes
for which . . . funds are expended.”50
In addition to this four-part test, Dole also declared that Congress may not
use its power to impose conditions on federal funding to “coerce” the states.
Specifically, the Court noted that “in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”51 This point has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, albeit without significant elaboration.52
Although not explaining what amount or degree of financial inducement
would be enough to turn “pressure” into “compulsion,” the Dole majority noted
Congress only conditioned “a relatively small percentage of certain federal
highway funds”53—specifically 5 percent of the funds from specific highway
grant programs—on compliance with the applicable condition. Such an
imposition was not coercive because it represented “relatively mild
encouragement,” and left states with the ability to decline to cooperate.54 This
language in Dole suggests the measure of coercion may be the amount of money
46. See Engdahl, supra note 9, at 78 (noting “sufficient clarity is required not only as to the fact
that an obligation is being assumed, but also as to the scope or scale of that obligation”).
47. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). The interpretive rule urged
in Pennhurst is arguably in tension with Chevron deference for agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutory language. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1197, 1212 (2004).
48. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08 (noting “conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs’” (quoting Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
49. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (citations omitted).
50. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
51. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
52. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687
(1999) (noting that, in some instances, “the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive
as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion” (quotation omitted)); see also New York, 505
U.S. at 167 (noting limits of federal spending power).
53. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
54. Id.

Adler Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017 12:55 PM

2016]

IS THE CLEAN AIR ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

681

at stake, and the extent to which the money in question places an intolerable
degree of pressure on state policy makers. Alternatively, insofar as the inquiry is
designed to safeguard state sovereignty, the coercion inquiry could turn on
whether the manner in which the conditions were imposed “interferes with [a]
state’s sovereign accountability.” 55
As written, Dole does not make clear whether this prohibition is an
independent requirement for the use of conditional spending—a fifth prong to
Dole’s test—or a gloss on the doctrine. One possibility is that the degree of
scrutiny with which courts should apply the four-part test is dependent, in part,
on the amount of money at stake. Alternatively, as some scholars have suggested,
conditional spending requirements that readily satisfy Dole’s four stated
requirements may nonetheless be unconstitutionally coercive. 56
Justice O’Connor dissented in Dole, challenging the majority’s superficial
treatment of the four-pronged inquiry. Significantly, she did not dispute the
Court’s test or question the underlying federalism concerns animating it. Rather,
Justice O’Connor found the majority’s application of the test “cursory and
unconvincing.”57 In her view, the federal requirement that South Dakota raise its
drinking age in order to receive federal highway funds was not “reasonably
related” to the purposes for which the federal government funds highway
construction.58 Consequently, she believed, the condition failed the test outlined
by the majority.59 Without a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the
federal funds and the conditions that Congress imposed, she warned, the
conditions were tantamount to federal regulation of the state and jeopardized
state sovereignty.60
Although the Dole Court clearly stated that Congress’s power to impose
conditions on the receiving federal funds is limited, federal appellate courts have
been extremely reluctant to strike down federal programs for exceeding the scope
of the spending power.61 The “general welfare” prong is treated as a “complete
throw away,”62 and the other prongs have not fared much better.63 The

55. See Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole
Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 173 (2001) (“Coercion implicates a state’s ability to act as a
representative of its people, not the state’s level of temptation in choosing among alternatives.”).
56. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 36–38 (2001); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after
Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.1911, 1954 (1985).
57. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 213–14.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Id. at 215.
61. See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The Court has never
employed the [coercion] theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal courts have been similarly
reluctant to use it.”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The coercion theory has been
much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party.”).
62. See Baker & Berman, supra note 40, at 464.
63. Id. (“[T]he lower courts, quite predictably, have found little use for three of the five elements
of the test.”); id. at 466 (The other two elements have not fared much better, as most lower courts have
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relatedness prong of the Dole test perhaps has the greatest potential for
constraining the use of conditional spending. It is repeatedly referenced by the
lower courts, but rarely examined in any detail. 64 The concept of “coercive” uses
of federal spending has attracted some attention as well, but “the coercion theory
is somewhat amorphous and cannot easily be reduced to a neat set of black-letter
rules of application.”65
Most lower court challenges to conditional spending provisions under Dole
have been unsuccessful, with one notable exception. In Virginia Department of
Education v. Riley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en
banc, concluded that the Department of Education could not condition state
receipt of federal funds under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act on
compliance with terms not explicit in the statute itself. 66 According to the court’s
majority, “[l]anguage which, at best, only implicitly conditions the receipt of
federal funding on the fulfillment of certain conditions is insufficient to impose
on the state the condition sought.”67 Six of the thirteen judges in Riley went
further, suggesting that the withholding of $60 million in Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act funds on such a basis would also be unconstitutionally
“coercive” even if it had been explicitly authorized by Congress.68 In Dole, states
only risked losing a small portion of federal funding for failing to adopt a higher
drinking age. But in Riley, the Department sought to withhold “the entirety of a
substantial federal grant” because Virginia refused “to fulfill their federal
obligation in some insubstantial respect rather than submit to the policy dictates
of Washington in a matter peculiarly within their powers as sovereign states.” 69
Before NFIB, Riley had been the exception. Although often cited, the Dole
limitations had yet to be meaningfully enforced. Dole itself had found that
Congress acted within the scope of its spending power, and until NFIB, the Court
had never found a congressional spending condition unconstitutional. With little
guidance on how to apply Dole’s test, or what use of the conditional spending
power might exceed constitutional bounds, there was little reason for lower
courts—or Congress—to take the Dole limits seriously.
II.

COERCION, COOPERATION, AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT

Most major federal environmental statutes adopt a form of “cooperative
federalism,” incorporating some combination of incentives in order to encourage

read them “to be toothless, even nonjusticiable, en route to sustaining a wide range of conditional federal
spending legislation.”).
64. Id. at 466–67. But see Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1168 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (discussing the relatedness prong).
65. West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 2002).
66. 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 570 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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state cooperation.70 Under most of these statutes, the federal government outlines
the contours of a given regulatory program, typically through statutory mandates
elaborated upon by regulatory measures. States are then encouraged to
implement the program in lieu of the federal government, in accordance with
federal guidelines. Provided these standards are met, states are free to tailor the
details of their individual programs to accommodate local conditions and
concerns. In most cases the federal standards operate as a floor—albeit a highly
prescriptive one—and states remain free to adopt more stringent measures.71
State programs that meet federal standards are typically eligible for federal
financial assistance.72 States that fail to adopt adequate programs are not only
denied the relevant federal funding, but also can be subject to various sanctions
and federal preemption of their programs. 73 That is, if states refuse to regulate in
accordance with federal guidelines, the federal government may regulate in their
place. With the threat of conditional federal preemption hanging over them,
states do not always view their involvement as purely voluntary. Despite its
“cooperative” appellation, federal-state interactions in environmental policy can
be a source of substantial friction.74
70. For a breakdown of which major statutes use which incentives to encourage state cooperation,
see Ryan, supra note 20, at 1039. For a broader survey of cooperative federalism programs, see David A.
Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005).
71. Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV.
1516, 1534 (1995) (“The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take primary responsibility for
implementing federal standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent
standards.”). A notable exception is the case of product standards. As a general matter, federal product
standards, such as vehicle emission standards, tend to preempt more stringent state standards. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012) (preemption of state automobile emission standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A)
(2012) (preemption of state fuel standards).
72. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2012) (authorizing financial support for state water pollution
control programs that adopt desired pollution control policies); See also Robert V. Percival, Symposium Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1173
(1995) (noting the use of federal funding to encourage land-use planning and solid waste management).
73. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7509 (1990) (detailing sanctions for failure to attain NAAQS under the
CAA); see also Percival, supra note 72, at 1174 (noting under most environmental laws, the federal
government will adopt and enforce a federal regulatory program in the absence of a sufficient state
program).
74. See Percival, supra note 72, at 1144 (“[F]ederal environmental standards have been a chronic
source of friction for federal-state relations . . . .”). According to one study, state officials “resent what
they believe to be an overly prescriptive federal orientation toward state programs, especially in light of
stable or decreasing grant awards.” See DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 199 (1997). As noted earlier, this friction often leads to
litigation. See supra note 2 and cases cited therein; see also Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (challenging federal drinking water standards for arsenic); New Mexico v. EPA, 114 F.3d 290 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (challenging the federal government’s criteria for certification of compliance with disposal
regulations for radioactive waste from national defense activities); Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (challenging the federal government’s cost-benefit analysis, cancer risk range, federal/state cost
sharing requirements, and basis for departing from past policy, all promulgated under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); Wash. State Dep’t of Transp. v. EPA, 917
F.2d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (challenging decision by the EPA to include property owned by the state
agency on list of contaminated environmental areas subject to federal cleanup under the Superfund
program); California. v. EPA, 689 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (challenging the EPA’s deferral of funding

Adler Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017 12:55 PM

684

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:671

Among all federal environmental statutes, the CAA continues to be the
greatest source of federal-state conflict.75 The CAA relies upon conditional
preemption in addition to conditional spending in order to encourage state
compliance. It also represents Congress’s most aggressive effort to induce state
regulation through conditional spending, and is therefore the most vulnerable to
a spending power challenge. Whereas many federal environmental statutes attach
conditions on federal funding for state environmental programs, the CAA relies
upon the threat of withholding funding allocated for other purposes, specifically
federal highway funds, to ensure state cooperation.
Under the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants, such as
ozone (smog) and particulate matter (soot). 76 These standards must be set at a
level “the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator . . . are requisite to protect the public health,” allowing for “an
adequate margin of safety.”77 The EPA is authorized to propose NAAQS for
additional pollutants and is required to review the existing NAAQS every five
years.78 With one exception,79 this process has led to a fairly consistent
tightening of existing NAAQS, as additional scientific evidence has emerged
detailing the potential health effects of criteria air pollutants at lower levels. 80
Most recently, in 2015, the EPA announced it was again revising the
NAAQS for ozone, lowering it to 70 parts per billion.81 Almost immediately
after this new standard was finalized, several states and industry groups filed
suit.82 Opponents of the tighter standards cited the high costs of compliance, as

for two advanced waste treatment projects pursuant to EPA policy memorandum, seeking declaratory
judgment that memorandum was invalid, injunction against its use, and order requiring the EPA to apply
certain other procedures to its review of advanced waste treatment projects in lieu of those created by
memorandum).
75. See supra note 2.
76. See § 7408(a)(1).
77. See § 7409(b)(1); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding
NAAQS provisions against nondelegation challenge and holding the primary NAAQS must be set without
regard to cost). The CAA also provides for the establishment of “secondary” NAAQS that are intended to
“protect public welfare.” § 7409(b)(2).
78. See § 7409(d).
79. See Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Photochemical Oxidants, 44
Fed. Reg. 8202 (Feb. 8, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.9) (2016). This loosening of the standard was
upheld in American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1184–86 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The standard
was subsequently tightened in 1997. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,856 (1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.10).
80. For a useful overview of the ozone NAAQS and its history, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 6 AZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 420 (2015).
81. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,292, (Oct. 26, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 52, 53, 58).
82. See Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 15-1385 (consolidated with Nos. 15-1392, 15-1490, 151491, and 15-1494) (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 22, 2016).
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well as the difficulty of attaining an ozone NAAQS that, in some parts of the
country, may be approaching background ozone levels.83
States with areas that fail to attain NAAQS are required to draft State
Implementation Plans (SIPs), which they submit to the EPA for its approval.
Among other things, an adequate SIP must include “enforceable emission
limitations . . . as well as schedules and timetables for compliance,”84 monitoring
systems,85 a fee-based permitting system for stationary sources,86 an
enforcement program,87 and provisions for sufficient public participation in the
SIP process.88 The 1990 CAA Amendments added additional requirements for
state permitting programs for stationary sources.89 This SIP process is the “heart”
of the CAA.90
In the 1970s, the EPA sought to force states to implement the CAA in
accordance with the agency’s dictates. In a series of cases, the EPA argued that
states were simply required to implement various regulatory measures, such as
vehicle emission testing programs, mandated by federal law.91 The EPA
maintained that courts should order uncooperative state officials to adopt EPAmandated measures.92 Although the Supreme Court had not yet decided New
York or Printz, this claim was generally rejected in the courts of appeals.93 These
courts rested their holdings on the CAA’s text and structure, but several noted
that the EPA’s position raised serious constitutional questions.94 As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted, the EPA was “attempting to
commandeer the regulatory powers of the states, along with their personnel and
resources, for use in administering and enforcing a federal regulatory program

83. Id. at 40. See also Reitze, supra note 80, at 445–48. As Professor Arnold Reitze notes: “Where
background concentrations are large relative to the impact of controllable man-made sources of NOX and
VOC emissions within the U.S., effective control is difficult or impossible, especially in locations with
few remaining opportunities for local emission reductions.” Id. at 448.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(A) (2012).
85. § 7410 (a)(2)(B).
86. § 7410 (a)(2)(L).
87. § 7410 (a)(2)(C), (E).
88. States must provide “reasonable notice” and public hearings on SIPs, and consult with affected
local entities. § 7410 (a)(2), (a)(2)(M).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651o (2012).
90. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976).
91. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Maryland
v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
92. Brown, 521 F.2d at 831.
93. Id. at 832; Maryland, 530 F.2d at 227; Train, 521 F.2d at 984. A fourth federal appeals court
found in favor of the EPA. See Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Arnold W.
Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans – Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing
Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 345–48 (2004) (discussing litigation in 1970s and resulting
uncertainty as to whether the EPA could force states to implement air pollution control measures).
94. Brown, 431 U.S. at 102 (“All of the courts rested on statutory interpretation, but noted also that
serious constitutional questions might be raised if the statute were read as the United States argued it
should be.”).
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against the owners of motor vehicles.”95 Upholding such an assertion of federal
regulatory authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed,
“would reduce the states to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”96 The Supreme
Court initially accepted petitions for certiorari to consider the commandeering
question, but the federal government confessed error prior to argument and the
decisions were vacated.97 From that point on, it was uncontested that the EPA
could not simply tell states to implement the federal government’s preferred air
pollution control measures.
Although the EPA may not simply order the states to cooperate in the
implementation and enforcement of the CAA, the Act provides the EPA with
substantial leverage over state officials. Failure to cooperate with CAA
implementation places federal funding of state programs at risk.98 Most
significantly, if a state fails to submit a fully adequate SIP by the appropriate
deadlines, it is subject to federal sanctions (including the loss of federal highway
funds and increased offset requirements for new development), and the
imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) that the EPA will enforce.99
A state’s failure to comply can also prompt the EPA to deny permit applications
in nonattainment areas.100
The primary sanctions provisions are contained in CAA section 179.101
Section 179(b) provides for two sanctions: (1) a prohibition on federal highway
funding within the relevant nonattainment area, save for funding related to safety
improvements and mass transit programs, 102 and (2) an increase in the offset
requirements imposed on new or modified sources.103 Under section 179(a), the
EPA Administrator “shall apply” one of these two sanctions to states that fail to
submit a fully compliant SIP unless any deficiencies are corrected within
eighteen months.104 If, after an additional six months, the state still has not
complied with the applicable SIP requirements, the EPA Administrator is
required to impose whichever sanction has not already been imposed.105
95.
96.

Train, 521 F.2d at 992.
Brown, 521 F.2d at 839 (referring to an expanded Commerce Power). The Ninth Circuit further
made clear that its holding did not limit the federal government’s ability to induce state cooperation, such
as through the spending power, or to preempt state pollution control laws with more stringent federally
enforced requirements. Id.; see Maryland, 530 F.2d at 228 (“Inviting Maryland to administer the
regulations, and compelling her to do so under threat of injunctive and criminal sanctions, are two entirely
different propositions.”); Train, 521 F.2d at 989 (reaffirming federal power to preempt inconsistent state
regulations).
97. Brown, 431 U.S. at 103–04.
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a)(4) (2012) (air quality planning grants); § 7616 (water pollution
control grants).
99. § 7509.
100. See § 7413.
101. § 7509.
102. § 7509(b)(1).
103. § 7509(b)(2).
104. § 7509(a). The provision further provides that both sanctions shall apply if the Administrator
“finds lack of good faith.” Id.
105. Id.

Adler Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017 12:55 PM

2016]

IS THE CLEAN AIR ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

687

Sanctions must remain in place “until the Administrator determines that the State
has come into compliance.”106
As provided for under section 179, these sanctions are mandatory. 107 Under
regulations that the EPA promulgated in 1994, the offset sanction is to be
imposed first.108 The highway fund sanctions are then to be applied if the state
fails to come into compliance within six months of the offset sanction being
imposed.109 Under these regulations, as under section 179, the relevant sanctions
“shall apply” when the relevant conditions are met.110
Section 110(m) provides the EPA Administrator the additional
discretionary authority to impose sanctions “at any time” in “any portion of the
State the Administrator determines reasonable and appropriate,” after having
made the requisite findings of noncompliance specified in section 179.111 In
other words, the EPA may impose sanctions throughout a state even if the
relevant SIP deficiency only applies to a smaller area.112 The EPA may not,
however, impose sanctions statewide within twenty-four months of an initial
finding of noncompliance “where one or more political subdivisions covered by
the applicable implementation plan are principally responsible for such

106.
107.

Id.
See Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F. 3d 138, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting the
CAA “requires the EPA to impose sanctions on a State that fails to submit an adequate [State
Implementation] plan or implement an approved plan if it does not correct the deficiency within 18
months” (citing § 7509(a)) (emphasis added)).
Some commentators have made the claim that the imposition of sanctions under section 179 may
be avoided once the federal government imposes and implements a FIP. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 20, at
1050; Baake, supra note 20, at 6–8. Professor Erin Ryan and David Baake cite 40 C.F.R. § 93.120 (2008)
in support of this proposition. Yet this regulation implements the transportation conformity provision in
CAA section 176, not the sanctions provisions in CAA section 179. The EPA’s regulations interpreting
and implementing section 179 are found elsewhere, at §§ 52.30 and 52.31, and do not suggest that the
imposition of a FIP removes the threat of sanctions.
Baake also cites the EPA’s Federal Register notice explaining why the adoption of a FIP for crossstate air pollution does not trigger sanctions for further support of this point. See Baake, supra note 20, at
7; Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 71
Fed. Reg. 25,328 (Apr. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 73, 74, 78, 96, 97). Yet, as
this notice explains, the reason the EPA’s FIP does not trigger sanctions is not because the existence of a
FIP eliminates the sanction threat, but because of the specific CAA provisions under which the EPA took
this action. As the EPA explained, “[t]he findings do not start a sanctions clock pursuant to section 179
because the findings do not pertain to a part D plan for nonattainment areas required under section
110(a)(2)(I) and because the action is not a SIP Call pursuant to section 110(k)(5).” 71 Fed. Reg. at 25,333.
In other words, there was no threat of sanctions here not because of the existence of a FIP, but because
the EPA did not make the necessary findings under the relevant provisions of the CAA to trigger the
sanctions clock.
108. 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(d) (2016).
109. § 52.31(d)(1).
110. Id.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m) (2000).
112. See Reitze, supra note 93, at 356 (“Once a finding under section 179(a) has been made, the
Administrator may, pursuant to section 110(m), apply the sanctions to any portion of the State. Using
section 110(m) allows sanctions to be applied to a larger area than sanctions imposed pursuant to section
179(a).”).
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deficiency.”113 In other words, the EPA may not punish an entire state for the
failings of one or more of its subdivisions—at least not right away.
Taken together, sections 179 and 110(m) provide that if a state fails to
comply with the relevant SIP requirements, the EPA may impose the highway
funding and offset sanctions. If the state does not come into compliance within
eighteen months of the EPA’s initial noncompliance determination, however, the
sanctions must be imposed, at least in those portions of the state subject to the
EPA’s finding of noncompliance. Section 179 makes sanctions mandatory in
noncompliant areas after states have had time to comply. Section 110(m),
however, allows the EPA to impose sanctions sooner and more broadly.
Although the EPA may be reluctant to impose painful sanctions on
noncompliant states, its discretion is limited due to the CAA’s citizen suit
provisions. Under these provisions, individual citizens and activist groups may
force the EPA’s hand through citizen suits seeking to enforce the express
requirements of the CAA and associated regulations.114 Thus, short of corrective
legislation, states’ ability to seek compromise over CAA enforcement is
constrained.115 In addition to the sanction provisions, a separate set of CAA
provisions—the so-called “conformity” provisions—require local transportation
projects to be in compliance with, or “conform” to, an EPA-approved SIP in
order to be eligible for federal funding.116
The EPA threatens to impose sanctions far more frequently than it actually
imposes them.117 Since the CAA was last amended in 1990, sanctions have been
threatened hundreds of times.118 Between 1990 and 1999, for instance, the EPA
made noncompliance findings that triggered the sanctions clock over 850
times.119 In only 18 of the instances, however, were sanctions actually
imposed.120 The threat of sanctions is usually enough to induce even reluctant
states to comply.121 Where sanctions are imposed, they usually do not remain in

113. Section 110(m) specifically requires the EPA to promulgate regulations to ensure “such
sanctions are not applied on a statewide basis where one or more political subdivisions covered by the
applicable implementation plan are principally responsible for such deficiency.” The required regulation,
setting forth criteria governing when sanctions may be imposed on a statewide basis, is at 40 C.F.R. §
52.30 (2016).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012). In 2015, for example, environmentalist organizations threatened to
sue the EPA for failing to enforce SIP requirements for the 2008 revisions to the ozone NAAQS. See
Reitze, supra note 80, at 440; see also Anuradha Sivaram, Why Citizen Suits Against the States Would
Ensure the Legitimacy of Cooperative Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (2013).
115. See § 7604.
116. § 7506.
117. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30131, HIGHWAY FUND SANCTIONS
AND CONFORMITY UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 3 (1999) (“Imposition of sanctions is a relatively rare
event, but their invocation to prompt state action is not.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 4.
121. In some cases, sanctions are threatened because a state SIP submission is technically deficient,
but due to a drafting error or a minor deficiency, and not due to a state’s effort to resist the relevant
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place for long.122 For most states, the threat of losing highway funds is a very
powerful incentive to cooperate.123
Three cases have considered state challenges to the constitutionality of the
CAA sanction provisions. Two of the cases focused on the application of Dole
to the sanction provisions. The third solely considered the implications of NFIB.
None of these challenges was successful.
In 1995, Missouri and Virginia each alleged that the EPA’s decision to
impose sanctions, if not the statutory provisions authorizing sanctions
themselves, unconstitutionally infringed upon state sovereignty. 124 According to
these two states, the CAA impermissibly authorized the EPA to impose severe
sanctions for their failure to comply with the EPA’s interpretation of the Act.125
Both claimed that the highway fund sanction was an unconstitutional use of the
federal spending power. Neither state succeeded.
In Virginia v. Browner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found that the CAA’s provisions passed constitutional muster “because although
its sanctions provisions potentially burden the states, those sanctions amount to
inducement rather than ‘outright coercion.’”126 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri in Missouri v. United States reached a similar conclusion,
relying upon dicta in New York that “conditions [on receipt of federal funds]
must . . . bear some relationship to the purpose of federal spending.”127 For the
Missouri court, “the appropriate focus is not on the alleged impact of a statute on
a particular state program . . . but whether Congress has ‘directly compel[led]’
the state ‘to enact a federal regulatory program.’” 128 Although the Missouri court

requirements. Therefore, the total number of cases in which sanctions are threatened likely overstates the
degree of state resistance to the CAA’s SIP requirements.
122. In April 2003, for example, the EPA imposed offset sanctions in the San Francisco Bay area.
See Approval and Promulgation of Ozone Attainment Plan and Finding of Failure to Attain; State of
California, San Francisco Bay Area, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,340 (Sept. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
52). These sanctions were only in place for three months, however, as they were stayed upon the
submission of a corrected SIP. See Interim Determination That State of California Has Corrected
Deficiencies and Stay and Deferral of Sanctions; San Francisco Bay Area, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,172 (July 16,
2003).
123. According to Professor Richard Stewart, “such a condition,” the combination of a burden on
citizens and loss of funds, “accompanying funds which the state cannot afford to forgo, intensifies federal
interference with local mechanisms of political accountability by compelling states to enforce against their
constituencies restrictions the constituencies oppose.” Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale
L.J. 1196, 1255 (1977).
124. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 880 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F.
Supp. 1320, 1322 (1996), vacated, 109 F.3d 440 (1997).
125. See Virginia, 80 F.3d at 873; Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1326. Virginia also argued that the EPA
was wrong to conclude that its stationary source permit program failed to comply with Title V of the CAA.
Virginia, 80 F.3d at 872–73.
126. Id. at 881 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
127. Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 167) (emphasis in Missouri
opinion).
128. Id. at 1328 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 161).
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only addressed the question of whether such sanctions were unconstitutional on
their face, it implied that an as-applied challenge would not fare any better. 129
More recently, in Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality v.
EPA, the D.C. Circuit rejected arguments by Texas and Mississippi that the
“[CAA]’s sanctions for noncompliant states impose such a steep price that State
officials effectively have no choice but to comply—in contravention of the
Supreme Court’s decision in [NFIB].”130 The court found the CAA highway
funds sanctions “not nearly as coercive as those in the ACA.”131 This third case
is the only challenge to the imposition of highway fund sanctions since NFIB.
Interestingly enough, the petitioners in this case relied exclusively on NFIB and
did not claim the imposition of highway fund sanctions was unconstitutional
under Dole.132
More challenges could be on the horizon. As of September 2015, only a
handful of nonattainment areas were subject to or under threat of sanctions. In
nearly all jurisdictions that were on the sanctions clock, the EPA stayed or
suspended the sanctions once the jurisdiction in question fixed whatever
deficiencies the EPA had found or otherwise demonstrated attainment with the
relevant NAAQS.133 This could change.
With the adoption of more stringent NAAQS in 2008 and 2015, the costs of
CAA compliance are increasing for both private regulated firms as well as for
state and local governments. As these costs increase—and standards become
more difficult to meet—state resistance and noncompliance with the applicable
SIP requirements are likely to increase. The amount of money at risk is
potentially significant. On average, federal highway funds account for between
3-4 percent of each state’s budget,134 or approximately one-third of state
transportation spending.135 Transportation spending also accounts for one of the
larger components of state budgets, after Medicaid and education spending.136
A loss of federal highway funding would be quite significant. As a consequence,

129. Id. at 1329. Missouri had sought to challenge the provisions on both grounds, but the district
court determined that an as-applied claim was not yet ripe. Id.
130. Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F. 3d 138, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
131. Id. at 177.
132. See id. at 176 n.21.
133. See Status of Sanctions Clocks Under the Clean Air Act, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT.
TRANSP., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/air_quality/highway_sanctions/sanctionsclock.cfm (last
updated Dec. 16, 2015).
134. Authors’ calculations based upon data from the National Association of State Budget Officers
(NASBO). See Archive of State Expenditure Report, NASBO, http://www.nasbo.org/mainsite/reportsdata/state-expenditure-report/state-expenditure-archives. The state average was 3.97 percent in FY 2013
and 3.85 percent in FY 2014. In states with large land areas and relatively small populations, however,
federal highway funds may account for as much as 10 percent of a state’s budget. In FY 2013, this was
true of Montana and South Dakota. Id.
135. Id. In FY 2013 and FY 2014, for example, federal funds accounted for 32.2 percent and 31.1
percent of total state transportation spending, respectively.
136. Id.
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additional litigation challenging the constitutionality of CAA sanctions is
likely.137
III.

NFIB V. SEBELIUS: CONDITIONAL SPENDING DOCTRINE REBORN

The success of future challenges to the CAA sanction regime may turn on
how courts interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius. The
primary challenge to the constitutionality of the PPACA in NFIB was directed at
the minimum coverage requirement, a.k.a. the “individual mandate.”138 Private
and state petitioners maintained that this provision exceeded the scope of the
federal government’s power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States” as supplemented by the power “to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”139 They
also maintained that the individual mandate could not be justified as an exercise
of the federal government’s taxing power. The petitioners prevailed on the first
claim, but the individual mandate was ultimately upheld on the latter.140
State petitioners also brought a claim concerning the PPACA’s provisions
expanding the federal Medicaid program. Specifically, the state petitioners
(representing a majority of the states) argued that Congress exceeded the scope
of the spending power by conditioning receipt of all Medicaid funds on state
willingness to accept a dramatic increase in the scope of the program.141
Commentators largely dismissed this claim when the lawsuit against the PPACA
began,142 yet this claim was ultimately more successful than those made against
the individual mandate. It could also prove to be the most consequential,
particularly for environmental law.

137. An additional factor that is likely to contribute to renewed legal challenges against the federal
highway fund sanctions is the increasingly oppositional posture of state attorneys general. In recent years,
state attorneys general have become particularly aggressive in challenging perceived federal regulatory
overreach in federal court. The decision of twenty-seven states to challenge the lawfulness of the Clean
Power Plan is but one example. See infra part V.B.
138. For an overview of the constitutional challenges to the PPACA that culminated in NFIB v.
Sebelius, see JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
OBAMACARE (2013).
139. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
140. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591, 2600 (2012).
141. Id. at 2582 (“[T]he state plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit argued that the Medicaid expansion
exceeds Congress’s constitutional powers” and “the threatened loss of all federal Medicaid funding
violates the Tenth Amendment by coercing them into complying with the Medicaid expansion.”).
142. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Clearing Out the Underbrush in Constitutional Challenges to Health
Insurance Reform, 364 N. ENGL. J. MED. 793, 794–95 (2011) (noting coercion arguments “found very
little support among constitutional scholars” and have “little realistic chance” to succeed); Sara
Rosenbaum, The States’ Medicaid ‘Coercion’ Claim: More Rhetoric Than Fact, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG
(Dec. 14, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/12/14/the-states-medicaid-coercion-claim-morerhetoric-than-fact/ (“[T]he states’ arguments are predicated on erroneous factual assertions that fly directly
in the face of Medicaid’s entire history and structure”); see also David A. Hyman, Why Did Law
Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 815 n.62 (2014)
(collecting additional examples).
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A. The Medicaid Expansion
Medicaid is, in many respects, a “prototypical” program of cooperative
federalism.143 It has achieved widespread participation despite being a source of
continued federal-state friction.144 As with other cooperative federalism
programs, the federal government provides states with substantial funding in
return for state implementation of the program in accordance with federal
requirements. The program, as created in 1965 and subsequently amended,
provides for medical assistance for women, children, needy families, the blind,
the elderly, and the disabled.145 The various federal conditions placed on the
program concern who is eligible for medical care through the program, what
services are covered, and under what conditions. Over the years, states have
become highly dependent on federal Medicaid funding for the maintenance of
their programs. By the time NFIB was litigated, federal Medicaid funding
accounted for over 10 percent of the typical state’s annual budget.146
The PPACA expanded the Medicaid program well beyond the initial
targeted populations with the express purpose of expanding health insurance
coverage among uninsured populations.147 Most notably, the PPACA obligated
states to expand eligibility to cover all adults with incomes below 133 percent of
the federal poverty line.148 In return, the federal government agreed to cover the
lion’s share of the added costs for the first several years of the program.149 If a
state were to refuse this expansion, however, the PPACA provided that a state
would lose all of its Medicaid funding, both funding allocated to pay for the
expansion as well as all funding for the pre-existing Medicaid program. By
leveraging state reliance on existing state funding to induce state cooperation
with the expansion, state petitioners argued, the federal government was
engaging in unconstitutional “coercion” of the states, contrary to Dole.

143. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Medicaid is a prototypical example
of federal-state cooperation in serving the Nation’s general welfare.”); see also James F. Blumstein &
Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee (Tenncare) as a Case
Study and a Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125, 136–49 (2000) (discussing and analyzing Medicaid as a
cooperative federalism program).
144. See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 432 (2011).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2012); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2572.
146. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2581 (“Federal funds received through the Medicaid program have become
a substantial part of state budgets, now constituting over 10 percent of most States’ total revenue.”); id. at
2657 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“For the average State, the annual federal
Medicaid subsidy is equal to more than one-fifth of the State’s expenditures” with federal funds covering
50 to 83 percent of those costs.).
147. See Huberfeld, supra note 144, at 450.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (2012).
149. The degree of federal funding has been described as a “supermatch.” See Huberfeld, supra note
144, at 451.
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B. The Medicaid Ruling
Seven Justices were ultimately convinced that the Medicaid expansion, as
written, was unconstitutionally coercive. In two separate opinions—one by the
Chief Justice and the other by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—the
Court declared that these provisions of the PPACA exceeded the bounds of
Congress’s spending power. The Court did not settle on a single rationale.
Nonetheless, NFIB marked the first time the Court invalidated conditions placed
on federal spending in over seventy years, and (arguably) the first time the Court
has ever found the use of conditional spending to be unconstitutionally
“coercive.”150 While acknowledging Congress’s broad authority to set
conditions on federal funds, a majority of the Court reaffirmed that this authority
is subject to judicially enforceable limits.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, concluded that
Congress unconstitutionally coerced the states by presenting them with an offer
that could not be refused.151 Long-standing state reliance on Medicaid funds
made states vulnerable to this coercion. Insofar as Congress told states that their
continued receipt of this funding depended upon adopting what was, in practical
terms, a new and different program,152 Congress was impermissibly leveraging
state reliance on the preexisting Medicaid program.153 It is one thing to place
conditions on how money is to be spent, the Chief Justice explained. This
happens all the time. It is something else entirely, however, when the conditions
placed on the receipt of federal money “take the form of threats to terminate other
significant independent grants.”154 In such cases, “the conditions are properly
viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”155 And
such pressure, if sufficiently severe, is potentially coercive. The cure for this
infirmity, according to the Chief Justice, was to sever the two programs. Only
funding for the Medicaid expansion would depend on a state’s willingness to
accept the conditions of the expansion. Traditional Medicaid funding, on the
other hand, would only be conditioned on state compliance with the traditional
requirements of that program.
The joint dissent adopted a broader rationale and sought a broader remedy.
According to the joint dissent, the constitutional problem was not the federal
government’s attempt to leverage long-standing state participation in Medicaid
so much as the federal government’s willingness to put so much money at stake.
Because federal and state tax dollars ultimately come from the same source—
150. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Prior to today’s decision, however,
the Court has never ruled that the terms of any grant crossed the indistinct line between temptation and
coercion.”); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996) (“No court, however, has ever struck
down a federal statute on grounds that it exceeded the Spending Power.”).
151. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (majority opinion).
152. Id. at 2607.
153. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 866–67.
154. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
155. Id.
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American taxpayers—threatening to withhold large enough sums of money from
noncooperative states is, itself, potentially coercive.156 Although states retained
the legal option to turn down the federal government’s offer, no state could
actually make that choice because a nonconsenting state would be unable to
make up for the loss of federal funding for state programs. 157
Because the Chief Justice’s opinion adopted a narrower holding, it is the
focus of this Article’s analysis. Traditionally, the narrowest opinion is viewed as
the controlling opinion, and the one most likely to be followed by lower
courts.158 Insofar as the CAA or other federal statutes are vulnerable to
constitutional challenge after NFIB, it will likely be because they fail to satisfy
the analysis offered by the Chief Justice.
C. NFIB and Dole
Even after NFIB, the extent of the constitutional limits on the use of
conditional spending is unclear. Although many rightly see Chief Justice
Roberts’s controlling opinion as “giving teeth” to the Court’s earlier spending
power jurisprudence—crystalized in the four-part test announced in Dole—some
confusion lingers over the relationship between NFIB and Dole, as well as how
courts should now apply Dole and NFIB in future cases. Some scholars have
even suggested that Chief Justice Roberts’s “opaque . . . application of the four
Dole factors” effectively announces “a new judicial approach to Medicaid and
other Spending Clause cases.”159 Another commentator has criticized NFIB for
creating “a wholly new constitutional limit” 160 while neglecting Dole and failing
to provide “a more satisfying integration with preceding spending power
precedent.”161 In our view, NFIB is best understood as an extension and
application of the principles articulated in Dole, focusing on those aspects of the
doctrine that were most relevant to the specific question of the Medicaid
expansion’s constitutionality.
Chief Justice Roberts’s treatment of the Dole factors was regrettably
“unclear and disorganized.”162 But, as Professors Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth
156.
157.

See id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2663 (“[T]he sheer size of this federal spending program in relation to state expenditures
means that a State would be very hard pressed to compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting other
spending or raising additional revenue.”).
158. See Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that the Roberts opinion
rejected the conditions placed upon Medicaid funding on narrower grounds than did the joint dissent). As
Professor Samuel Bagenstos notes, under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), where “no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.’” See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 868 n.24.
159. Nicole Huberfeld, et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1, 58 (2013); see Joondeph, supra
note 13, at 815–16.
160. Ryan, supra note 20, at 1026.
161. Id. at 1022 n.92.
162. Huberfeld, et al., supra note 159, at 50.
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Weeks Leonard, and Kevin Outterson (hereinafter Huberfeld, et al.) have
observed, “[t]he NFIB opinions relied heavily, but indirectly, on the elements of
the Dole test.”163 Indeed, they acknowledge, the “elements of the Dole test
feature prominently in the plurality opinion, though not identified as such.”164
Despite a rather disorganized treatment of Dole, Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion raised the same animating concerns and relied upon the same spending
power cases as Dole. As noted above, Dole’s four-part test requires: (1) that the
spending at issue be “in pursuit of ‘the general welfare’”; (2) that conditions on
the states’ receipt of federal funds be stated “unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the
States to exercise their choice knowingly”; (3) that the conditions on federal
grants be related to the federal interest in the funded project; and (4) that no other
constitutional provisions bar the conditional grant.165
The Dole majority provided a perfunctory explanation of the first three of
these four factors because South Dakota did not argue that the conditional
spending in question was “inconsistent with any of the first three restrictions.” 166
In fact, “the basic point of disagreement between the parties” turned largely on
“whether the Twenty-first Amendment constitute[d] an ‘independent
constitutional bar’ to the conditional grant of federal funds.”167 Thus, the Dole
Court had little reason to elaborate on the first three limitations on the spending
power—they were uncontested. Regarding the “relatedness” factor, the Dole
majority merely observed that “rather than challenging the germaneness of the
condition to federal purposes,” South Dakota “‘never contended that the
congressional action was . . . unrelated to a national concern in the absence of
the Twenty-first Amendment.’”168 Accordingly, the Court was content to note
that because South Dakota did not argue a “relatedness” or “germaneness”
concern (terms that this Article and the Court use interchangeably), no further
analysis of “whether conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of
the expenditure might be outside the bounds of the spending power” was
needed.169
Similarly, insofar as the parties and the lower courts in NFIB did not
prominently discuss the Dole factors, the NFIB Court’s treatment of those factors
was less than methodical. Nevertheless, in striking down the PPACA’s
conditions, the Chief Justice’s opinion invoked the same constitutional
limitations and principles set forth in Dole. Perhaps more importantly, his
opinion reaffirmed the fundamental principle and federalism concerns expressed
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 51.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
640–41 (1937)).
166. Id. at 208.
167. Id. at 209 (quoting Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256,
269–70 (1985)).
168. Id. at 208 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 52, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (No.
86–260)).
169. Id. at 208 n.3.
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summarily by the Dole majority, but explained more fully by Justice O’Connor’s
“relatively narrow” disagreement with the Court’s application of the principle in
her dissent.
From the beginning, the Chief Justice’s opinion evinces a concern for
federalism170 and is mindful that Congress may not commandeer the states
through the spending power. The Chief Justice understood the states to argue that
the PPACA’s threat to withhold all of a state’s Medicaid grants unless the state
accepted the expansion and its conditions would “violate[] the basic principle
that the ‘Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.’”171 These same concerns informed both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Dole.
The spending at issue in NFIB was for the “general welfare,” as the Court
has long understood this term, and Congress did not require states to engage in
unconstitutional conduct as a condition of receiving the funds. Thus, the PPACA
spending conditions readily satisfied these two elements of the Dole test.
Accordingly, the NFIB Court had no reason to discuss them. The PPACA’s threat
to withhold existing Medicaid funds from states that did not participate in the
expansion, however, did raise constitutional concerns addressed by Dole’s other
limitations.
Without expressly citing Dole’s four-part test, Chief Justice Roberts began
his discussion of the Court’s “recognized limits on Congress’s power under the
Spending Clause” by quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman: “We have repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation
as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’”172 Because of this “characterization,” the
Chief Justice explained, “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending
power ‘thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the
terms of the ‘contract.’”173 Without a voluntary and knowing acceptance of the
terms of Congress’s offer, the conditional spending is unconstitutional. 174
Also relying on Pennhurst, the Dole Court had explained that “if Congress
desires to condition the States’ receipt of funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . .
170. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (“Respecting this limitation is critical to
ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of the States as independent
sovereigns in our federal system. . . . For this reason, ‘the Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.’” (quoting
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992))).
171. Id. at 2601 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
172. Id. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
173. Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
174. Scholars have debated whether conditional spending should be analogized to a “contract.” See,
e.g., Berman, supra note 17, at 1297–1309; Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats Versus Uncontrived
Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and
Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 503, 544–53 (2016); James F. Blumstein, NFIB v. Sebelius and Enforceable
Limits on Federal Leveraging: The Contract Paradigm, the Clear Notice Rule, and the Coercion
Principle, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 123, 129–30 (2013); James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the
Affordable Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule,
2011-12 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 71–77 (2012).
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, enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation.’”175 In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts
explained why this must be so: “Respecting this limitation is critical to ensuring
that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of the States as
independent sovereigns in our federal system.” 176 And it is out of this critical
concern for federalism that the Court will “strike down federal legislation that
commandeers a State’s legislative or administrative apparatus for federal
purposes,” and will “scrutinize Spending Clause legislation to ensure that
Congress is not using financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to undue
influence.’”177 Congress’s “financial inducements” and “undue influence” only
present constitutional concerns when they are used so as to “require the States to
regulate,” effectively commandeering the states for federal purposes, and thus
“undermin[ing] . . . our federal system.”178
Addressing the constitutional limits of the spending power, the Chief Justice
invoked both Pennhurst and Dole, building upon the former’s “contract
characterization” and the latter’s related requirement of “unambiguous notice.”
He expounded on this concern, discussing coercion, political accountability, and
“undue influence” as described in Steward Machine, before returning to confirm
that “Congress may attach appropriate conditions to federal taxing and spending
programs to preserve its control over the use of federal funds.”179 Because of the
inherent tension between these two concerns the Court must first determine
whether (1) the conditions at issue are merely Congress’s attempt to “preserve
its control over the use of federal funds,” or a means of enlisting states in the
federal regulatory apparatus; and (2) the conditions at issue have “crossed the
line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.”180
The Chief Justice’s opinion later revisited the Dole “notice” factor, but it is
at this point—in an effort to make these crucial determinations—that the Chief
Justice’s analysis turned to how Congress structured the PPACA funding. As the
opinion described, “[i]nstead of simply refusing to grant the new funds to States
that will not accept the new conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold
those States’ existing Medicaid funds.”181 The Chief Justice agreed with the
states’ contention that “this threat serves no purpose other than to force unwilling
States to sign up for the dramatic expansion,”182 finding that the federal
government was doing far more than conditioning the receipt of new funds on
state willingness to comply with conditions on those funds. Rather, Congress was
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
Id. (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
Id.
Id. at 2603 (discussing Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the
unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 against claims these provisions
constituted an unconstitutionally coercive use of the spending power)).
180. Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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conditioning prior funding to induce states to adopt new policies. And “such
conditions [that] take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants . . . are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States
to accept policy changes.”183
Having found the purpose of the spending conditions at issue, the Chief
Justice’s reasoning pivoted to another Dole factor without expressly invoking the
Dole framework. Whether the PPACA’s condition threatens an “independent
grant” is another way of asking whether the condition is reasonably related or
“germane” to the federal interest in the program. Much of the subsequent
discussion in the Chief Justice’s opinion concerned whether the Medicaid
expansion was “properly viewed merely as a modification of the existing
program,” whether the expansion “accomplishe[d] a shift in kind, not merely
degree,” how the expansion was “structured,” and whether earlier Medicaid
amendments “f[e]ll into the same category as the one at stake here.” 184 These
factors informed his determination that Congress had leveraged the states’
reliance on one program to induce them to participate in another, new program—
and this made the spending conditions “unrelated” to the funding.
The distinction drawn by the Chief Justice between “old” and “new”
Medicaid is questionable, to say the least.185 Among other things, there is no
meaningful division between the two programs in the U.S. Code. Huberfeld, et
al. fear that, in nonetheless characterizing traditional Medicaid and the PPACA’s
Medicaid expansion as separate programs, the Court “modified the
‘germaneness’ prong of the Dole test,” creating new opportunities for litigants to
challenge the “relatedness” of new conditions on old sources of funding.186
To be sure, the Chief Justice engaged in a more rigorous application of the
factors articulated in Dole, the relatedness and notice requirements in particular.
One reason for this may have been the amount of money at stake: 10 percent or
more of the average state’s budget in NFIB as opposed to “less than half of one
percent of South Dakota’s budget” in Dole.187 The more money there is on the
line, the greater the risk that the federal government may be coercing the states
by leveraging their reliance on a pre-existing federal program. This is not a new
test, however.
The Dole majority did not much discuss the “relatedness” factor other than
to note that South Dakota never contended that the condition was unrelated to
the federal interest, and then to state summarily that the drinking age requirement
was “directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are

183.
184.
185.

Id. at 2604.
Id. at 2605–06.
See Huberfeld, et al., supra note 159, at 55 (criticizing “the artificial distinction . . . between
‘old’ and ‘new’ Medicaid”); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Medicaid, as
amended by the ACA, . . . is not two spending programs; it is a single program with a constant aim . . . .”).
186. Huberfeld, et al., supra note 159, at 55.
187. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
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expended—safe interstate travel.”188 Huberfeld, et al., are correct to note that the
“Court had not enforced relatedness in [the conditional spending] context,”189
but only insofar as this means the Court had not yet found a condition so
unrelated to the program that the Court had to strike it down. It is not that the
relatedness principle had never been applied, it is merely that the Court had yet
to be presented with a case in which the principle had been particularly
challenged, let alone violated.
Although Justice O’Connor disagreed with the Dole majority’s rather
superficial review of the “relatedness” principle, she took no issue with the
principle itself. She did not offer a “new concept” of relatedness, but a more
rigorous application of the existing concept articulated in United States v.
Butler190 and Oklahoma v. CSC.191 Justice O’Connor found the Dole majority’s
“application of the requirement that the condition imposed be reasonably related
to the purpose for which the funds are expended [to be] cursory and
unconvincing.”192 In her view, the minimum drinking age requirement was “not
sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning
funds appropriated for that purpose.”193 Instead, she argued:
[A] condition that a State will raise its drinking age to 21 cannot fairly be
said to be reasonably related to the expenditure of funds for highway
construction. The only possible connection, highway safety, has nothing to
do with how the funds Congress has appropriated are expended. Rather than
a condition determining how federal highway money shall be expended, it is
a regulation determining who shall be able to drink liquor. As such it is not
justified by the spending power.194

Justice O’Connor’s insistence that the germaneness factor be more
scrupulously applied stemmed from the same concern animating Chief Justice
Roberts’s line of inquiry: federalism and the preservation of state sovereignty in
the face of Congress’s spending power. Congress may not, she wrote, “insist as
a condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or change
regulations in other areas of the State’s social and economic life because of an
attenuated or tangential relationship to highway use or safety.”195 Why?
Because, in Justice O’Connor’s view, “if the rule were otherwise, the Congress
could effectively regulate almost any area of a State’s social, political, or
economic life on the theory that use of the interstate transportation system is
somehow enhanced.”196

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
Huberfeld, et al., supra note 159, at 55.
See 297 U.S. 1, 58 (1936).
See 330 U.S. 127, 135–36 (1947).
Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 215.
Id.
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The same animating concern drove the plurality opinion in NFIB to engage
in similar scrutiny of the purported relationship between the purpose of the
funding and the purpose of the condition attached to the receipt of that funding.
Both Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Dole and Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in
NFIB focus on whether the spending conditions merely restrict the use of the
expended funds, or whether they require states to make new policy choices. As
Huberfeld, et al., suggest, the plurality and the joint dissent in NFIB both tacitly
accepted Justice O’Connor’s demand that the Court “carefully scrutinize the
relatedness of conditions on federal programs, regardless of the way in which
Congress structures those programs or describes their germaneness.”197
Accordingly, future challenges to federal spending conditions are likely to focus
on whether “conditions unrelated to the program for which funding is offered
[are] deemed non-germane, and therefore coercive, depending on the amount and
percentage of funding at stake.”198 The Chief Justice referred to such
nongermane conditions as “a means of pressuring the States to accept policy
changes.”199 Justice O’Connor called them “regulations.”200
The NFIB plurality did not open a new line of attack against spending power
statutes, so much as it expanded the pre-existing terrain. NFIB applied Dole’s
germaneness prong (albeit with more teeth) and echoed, without attribution,
Justice O’Connor’s explanation for how that prong was intended to apply—
namely, that when a condition goes beyond specifying how the federal money
must be spent, the condition becomes regulatory insofar as it requires a state to
change its policy. For Justice O’Connor—applying the Court’s spending power
precedent and the Dole majority’s factors—the dichotomy in such cases is not
between “coercive” and “uncoercive” spending conditions, but rather between
“how to spend the money” and “a regulation determining who shall be able to
drink liquor.”201 In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts applied the same precedent and
principles at work in Dole and applied more rigorously by Justice O’Connor, and
he concluded that the structure of the PPACA conditions worked not to ensure
how the federal money is spent, but to force the states to change their Medicaid
policies. The former is permissible; the latter is unconstitutional—just as it was
in Dole.
Professor Erin Ryan has distilled Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion similarly.
Styling the plurality opinion as the “Sebelius doctrine,” she argues that NFIB will
require future cases to “distinguish (1) conditional funds that directly sponsor the
program in question from (2) federal funds sponsoring one program that are
conditioned on state participation in another program. While the former remain
presumptively permissible, the latter are potentially coercive under the new

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Huberfeld, et al., supra note 159, at 57.
Id. at 58.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 218.
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limit.”202 She, too, laments the “cavalier manner” in which NFIB treated
precedent, and argues that the Chief Justice’s opinion “lack[ed] the more
satisfying integration with principal case law that one might expect from a new
constitutional statement that does not purport to overrule prior cases.”203 We
agree with Ryan that after NFIB, courts may be more inclined to make this
distinction, but, as we have argued, the constitutional limit requiring that
spending conditions be “reasonably related to the expenditure of federal
funds”204 has been a long-standing element in the Court’s jurisprudence—not a
“new limit” or a “new constitutional statement.” 205 It was perhaps a forgotten,
toothless prong, but with NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts has given it some bite.
IV.

THE CLEAN AIR ACT RECONSIDERED

After NFIB, the CAA’s requirement that the EPA withhold federal highway
funds from noncompliant states appears vulnerable on several grounds. The
CAA, perhaps more than any other statute, stretches the bounds set forth in Dole
and expounded upon in NFIB. Although Congress has the authority to condition
pollution control expenditures on compliance with federal pollution control
priorities, there is a real question under Dole and NFIB as to whether it may
condition the receipt of federal highway funds on the implementation of desired
air pollution control measures.
First, the CAA “conditions” receipt of money for one program (highway
construction) on compliance with requirements in a separate program (air
pollution control). This conditioning stretches the relatedness prong in Dole and
suggests impermissible coercion under NFIB. Second, the requirements imposed
on states under the CAA are constantly changing as the EPA tightens or
otherwise revises federal air quality standards and additional pollutants become
subject to CAA regulation. Finally, the sheer amount of money at stake, in terms
of its percentage of state transportation spending, state budgets, and even in
absolute terms, itself suggests that the CAA may be unduly coercive under NFIB.
A. Relatedness
In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts was concerned with whether the PPACA’s
condition threatened an “independent grant[].”206 This concern informed his
determination that Congress was leveraging the states’ reliance on one program
to induce them to participate in another.207 The Chief Justice found that the
202.
203.
204.
205.

Ryan, supra note 20, at 1030.
Id. at 1031.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See Ryan, supra note 20, at 1003, 1030 (“new limit”); Ryan, supra note 20, at 1031 (“new
constitutional statement”); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (“We have repeatedly said that Congress may
condition grants under the spending power only in ways reasonably related to the purpose of the federal
program.”).
206. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
207. Id. at 2605–06.
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PPACA’s “new” Medicaid was sufficiently distinct from the “old” Medicaid
such that the new spending conditions were effectively unrelated to the old
Medicaid program.208 But the connection between “old” and “new” Medicaid is
much closer than any connection between the SIP requirements of the CAA and
federal highway money. In fact, even under Dole the CAA’s sanctions were
constitutionally suspect, though lower courts thus far have upheld them. 209
Federal highway legislation suggests many reasons why federal funding of
highway construction supports the “general welfare,” but environmental
protection is not one of them. In Dole, however, both the highway legislation and
the drinking age increase at issue were explicitly enacted to improve highway
safety.210 The connection between the CAA’s purpose and transportation is, at
best, attenuated. Nothing in the CAA requires any connection between the nature
of the state’s noncompliance and highways, mobile sources, or even the specific
pollutants most associated with vehicular traffic. Instead, states can lose their
highway funding for failing to meet any of the CAA’s myriad SIP
requirements.211 For example, failure to adopt a sufficiently rigorous stationary
source permit scheme, sufficiently stringent emission regulations on dry
cleaners, bakeries, and other “area” sources, or even failure to provide adequate
citizen suit access to state courts can provide the basis for rejecting a SIP and
imposing sanctions.212 The Federal Highway Administration, for its part, is
candid about the real purpose of the sanction, declaring on its website that the
highway fund sanction “could be air quality related in an area that is nonattainment for transportation related pollutants, but is intended primarily as an
economic incentive to SIP submission.”213
Congress has sought to connect highway construction to environmental
protection, but it has still stopped short of claiming federal support for highway
construction serves the purpose of environmental protection. The Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1970 instructed the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that
federal highway programs were “consistent with any approved plan for the
implementation of any ambient air quality standard for any air quality control
region designated pursuant to the [CAA].”214 Similarly, in 1991 Congress sought
to create an environmentally sound interstate highway system with the
208.
209.

Id. at 2606.
See supra notes 124–129 and accompanying text; see also Adler, supra note 15, at 447–52
(considering whether highway fund sanctions are consistent with Dole).
210. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09. Whether improving highway safety by, respectively, improving
road construction or reducing drunk driving, was the actual motivating purpose behind either of these
enactments is another matter.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (2012) (SIP is inadequate if the EPA Administrator finds, inter alia, that
the SIP fails to comply “with any requirement of this chapter”) (emphasis added).
212. See, e.g., Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 880 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA ability to
impose sanctions due to state’s failure to make it sufficiently easy for citizen groups to challenge stationary
source permits).
213. Clean Air Sanctions, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. TRANSP., http://www.fhwa.dot.
gov/environment//air_quality/highway_sanctions/index.cfm (last updated Sept. 10, 2015).
214. Pub. L. No. 91–605, 84 Stat. 1713 (1970).
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Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991.215 In 1998, Congress
reauthorized the Act with the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century,216
again reiterating its intent to “minimize transportation-related fuel consumption
and air pollution.”217 These statements indicate Congress’s desire to ensure
highway construction occurs in a manner consistent with federal environmental
policy goals, not that environmental protection is itself a purpose of such
funding.
Assessing the CAA’s vulnerability after NFIB, Ryan has argued that the
CAA’s “conditions are sufficiently related to satisfy the germaneness
requirements of Dole, because the use of state highways will contribute to that
state’s ambient air-quality problems through automobile exhaust.”218 We
disagree.
Although Congress has repeatedly noted the potential environmental
impacts of highway construction, none of these statutes establishes that a purpose
of federal highway programs is environmental protection. Yet it is the purpose
of federal funding that controls whether a given condition is sufficiently related
under Dole.219 These statutory highway provisions provide an indication of the
sort of highways that Congress sought to fund; they do not establish
environmental protection as a purpose of highway funding. In contrast, the
federal statute calling upon states to raise the drinking age in Dole echoed the
explicit purposes of the federal highway programs—safe highways. 220
Merely because automobile exhaust contributes to ambient air quality
problems is not in any way germane to the purpose of the highway funds. If the
germaneness factor may be satisfied merely because roads may “contribute to” a
state’s air quality concerns, then, as Justice O’Connor warned, “Congress could
effectively regulate almost any area of a State’s social, political, or economic life
on the theory that” air quality is somehow affected.221 This germaneness
interpretation, she understood, was not the law even after Dole. Were that not
enough, it is also worth noting that other provisions of the CAA—specifically
the section 176 conformity provisions—already serve to ensure that federal
highway funds do not contribute to nonattainment of relevant air quality
standards, so concerns about the relationship between highway funds and CAA
compliance are taken care of separate from the sanction threat. 222
We agree more with how Professor Samuel Bagenstos frames the CAA
sanctions: “Congress has told states that wish to continue participating in the
entrenched and lucrative federal highway program that they can do so only if
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Pub. L. No. 102–240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
Pub. L. No. 105–178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 170 (1998).
Ryan, supra note 20, at 1052.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
See id. at 208–09.
Id. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
42 U.S.C. § 7506 (2012).
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they also agree to participate in a separate and independent program for reducing
air pollution.”223 The CAA already places air quality planning funds at risk in
noncompliant states.224 The addition of the highway fund sanctions serves the
purpose of creating additional leverage—it is, in Professor Einer Elhauge’s
terminology, a “contrived threat.”225 It does not directly advance the CAA’s
goals.
The CAA is not itself the source of the funds it conditions, making more
tenuous the claim that the sanctions are an exercise of Congress’s spending
power. In threatening to withhold highway funding, the CAA sanctions do not
threaten to withhold CAA funds, but instead threaten the highway funding
authorized under Title 23 as part of a completely separate federal program. 226
The Title 23 program and the CAA are so separate and independent, in fact, that
Title 23 does not even mention the CAA’s so-called “conditions” for receiving
federal highway funds. Title 23 itself does, however, mention other conditions
placed upon the receipt of federal highway funds, including conditions related to
vehicle weights and sizes, advertising near roadways, the minimum drinking age
at issue in Dole, and employment discrimination rules and prevailing wage rates
on highway projects.227 States must comply with these conditions—all stated in
Title 23—or risk a 10 percent reduction in their allocated highway funds. 228 This
is a significant amount of money, but far less than is at stake with CAA
noncompliance.
There is no real doubt that the CAA sanctions and the federal highway funds
are separate and distinct federal programs that are “related” only in the most
tangential terms. The CAA sanctions are intended, as Bagenstos has suggested
(and the Federal Highway Administration has admitted), to convince potentially
unwilling states to participate in the SIP process. Understood this way, the
section 179 sanctions are vulnerable to a “relatedness” challenge under Dole, and
even more so after the NFIB plurality struck down the PPACA’s threat to
withhold “old” Medicaid funding because it “serves no purpose other than to
force unwilling States to sign up for the dramatic expansion in health care
coverage.”229

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 917.
§ 7509(a)(4) (2012).
See Elhauge, supra note 174, at 544–49.
§ 7509(b)(1).
See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 113 (2012) (requiring states to pay laborers on highway projects a
prevailing wage); § 127 (requiring states to police vehicle weight limits); § 131 (requiring states to enforce
restrictions on outdoor advertising near roadways); § 140 (requiring nondiscrimination in employment
practices in connection with highway projects); § 141 (requiring enforcement of vehicle sizes); § 158
(withholding funds for states that do not enforce a minimum drinking age of 21).
228. These conditions are all related to the original and explicitly stated purpose of the federal
highway grants. Congress may add and amend related conditions like these as they become necessary. So
it is not the case that Congress is precluded from imposing new conditions on existing federal funding,
but those conditions must satisfy the Dole requirements and be related to the original grant.
229. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012).
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B. Notice
There is some reason to question whether the sanctions under the CAA
satisfy the “notice” requirement of Pennhurst as applied by Dole and NFIB. Both
decisions adopt Pennhurst’s formulation of spending power legislation as being
“much in the nature of a contract.”230 In NFIB, the Chief Justice understood that
the “legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending power . . . ‘rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
contract.’”231 The NFIB plurality therefore explored whether the PPACA’s
Medicaid expansion had provided states with the requisite “notice” when they
signed on to Medicaid. As the Chief Justice reiterated, “if Congress intends to
impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously.”232 Despite Medicaid provisions “expressly reserving ‘[t]he
right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision’” of the Social Security Act, the
NFIB plurality suggested that the expansion failed the notice prong insofar as it
“accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree” that the states could not have
anticipated when they signed on to the Medicaid program.233 The expansion was
such that “[a] State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the
right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program included the power to transform
it so dramatically,”234 and that “[p]revious Medicaid amendments simply do not
fall into the same category as the one at stake here.”235 Turning again to
Pennhurst, the Chief Justice explained that the spending power “does not include
surprising participating States with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’
conditions.”236
Applying such scrutiny to the CAA sanctions suggests that those sanctions
may fail the “notice” test as well. Whereas the Medicaid program included
express statutory provisions notifying states that Congress may amend the
program’s terms, Title 23 includes no such similar warning that accepting
highway funds could later require states to participate in CAA programs. The
federal highway program also predates the CAA by decades.237 Thus, any
“conditions” imposed on the pre-existing, entrenched highway fund program by
the subsequently enacted CAA would seem to violate the NFIB and Pennhurst
bar on “surprising States with postacceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.” When
states originally signed on to the highway program, they could not have

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
Id. at 2605 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
Id.
Id. at 2606.
Id.
Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25).
The federal government began funding the interstate highway system with the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956. See History of the Interstate Highway System, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT.
TRANSP, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/Interstate/history.cfm (last updated July 12, 2016).
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anticipated that highway funds would be conditioned on the “nonattainment”
provisions of the CAA.
This is not to say that Congress may not create new, subsequent conditions
related to the original purpose of the program. As a general matter, Congress
remains free to alter the conditions imposed on the receipt of related federal funds
provided such changes do not fundamentally transform the programs. Yet
subsequent changes made by a regulatory agency—such as fleshing out
regulatory requirements in new or unforeseen ways—are more suspect.238
Particularly assuming that the states are protected by the “political safeguards of
federalism” in the legislative process, it would follow that unambiguous statutory
amendments to existing conditions would be more acceptable than the imposition
of new conditions through the regulatory process.239 Although the CAA itself
outlines broad requirements for SIPs, many ambiguous details are left to a
regulatory process. That process imposes constantly changing requirements that
are not subject to the same political safeguards as legislative changes as the EPA
tightens or otherwise revises federal air quality standards and the agency
determines that additional pollutants merit CAA regulation.
The text of the CAA, for example, may place a given state on notice that a
given air quality determination will require the adoption of an “enhanced”
vehicle inspection and maintenance program, but the precise contours and costs
of such a program are left to the EPA.240 Whether a given nonattainment area
must adopt pollution control measures at all is, in part, a function of subsequent
agency decisions, as is whether a given locality is considered to be part of one
attainment area or another and what data to rely upon in making nonattainment
determinations.241 Under the CAA, the EPA is authorized—indeed, required—
to reconsider the NAAQS every five years. 242 In recent years, the EPA has
tightened air quality standards, thereby requiring states to adopt more stringent
air pollution control measures than they may have anticipated.243 At the same
time, the EPA has adjusted SIP requirements over time to account for various

238.
239.

See, e.g., Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 560–61 (1997) (en banc) (per curiam).
Professor Ilya Somin notes, however, that the political safeguards argument is actually at its
weakest in the context of spending power. While state governments will often have strong incentive to
resist the assertion of federal power in areas traditionally left within state control, state governments “have
incentives to accept and even lobby for conditional federal grants.” For this reason, Somin argues “there
is a greater need for judicial intervention” in the Spending Clause context. Somin, supra note 36, at 484.
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 51.350–373 (regulations
detailing the requirements of vehicle emission inspection/maintenance programs).
241. For several examples of the range of specific determinations left to the EPA in implementing
and enforcing the CAA’s nonattainment provisions see Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality
v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 161–64 (2015).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2012).
243. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652,
38,861 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); see also Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 283
F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modifying 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (challenging EPA’s revision of
NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter).
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factors, such as changes in atmospheric modeling or revised estimates of upwind
state contributions to downwind state pollution problems.244
The notice problem is compounded by the fact that, under section 110(m),
the EPA has some discretion as to when and where sanctions apply. As discussed
above, section 179 details mandatory sanctions that are to be imposed after
eighteen and twenty-four months of state noncooperation.245 EPA regulations
provide that offset sanctions are imposed first, and highway sanctions second. 246
Section 110(m), however, enables the EPA to impose sanctions more quickly
and, subject to some limits, beyond the boundaries of the nonattainment area for
which the relevant SIP is inadequate.247 This means that when and whether
sanctions are to be imposed is less foreseeable than if it were fully governed by
the statute. States have less notice and less certainty as to when and whether
highway funds upon which they have come to rely may be placed at risk.
C. Coercion
The most important doctrinal development in NFIB may be the focus on the
amount of money at stake. Highway funds are raised from a dedicated revenue
source in gasoline taxes and placed in the Highway Trust Fund.248
Transportation spending is a major component of most states’ budgets, and
federal grants are typically a major share of state transportation expenditures.249
These moneys are explicitly earmarked for transportation projects.250
Conditioning the receipt of such funds on compliance with myriad federal
environmental requirements—many of which have little to do with
transportation, let alone with highways—seems to strain the Dole coercion
prong, particularly when viewed against the background of the Court’s broader
federalism jurisprudence.

244. See, e.g., Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,232 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97) (discussing revisions to 24-hour attainment demonstration methodology).
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2012); see also supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
246. 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(d) (2016).
247. Id.
248. For a brief overview of the history and financing of the Highway Trust Fund, see Salvatore
Massa, Surface Freight Transportation: Accounting for Subsidies in a “Free Market”, 4 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 285, 318–19 (2001).
249. See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text; see also Denis Binder, The Spending Clause
as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 160 (2001) (claiming
federal funds may account for as much as 95 percent of a state’s transportation budget).
250. Massa, supra note 248, at 318. Some argue that the “trust fund” system within the federal
budget is simply an accounting gimmick, and that there is not, in fact, a separate “fund” of highway
moneys. See, e.g., Thomas G. Donlan, Selling America Short, BARRON’S (Aug. 10, 1998),
http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB902528915450938000 (suggesting federal “trust funds” are
“budgetary gimmicks”). Whether this is true when the issue is deficit reduction, a strong argument can be
made that the federal government has a moral, if not legal, obligation to expend money from the trust fund
for road purposes and nothing else, as this is the express basis upon which the relevant moneys are raised.

Adler Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017 12:55 PM

708

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:671

Dole involved a modest loss of highway funds—only 5 percent, or less than
half of a percent of South Dakota’s total state budget.251 Yet under the CAA,
virtually all highway funds are at risk, except for those designated for special
purposes.252 Federal highway funding does not rise to the level of federal
Medicaid funding—typically 3-4 percent of a state’s budget253 as opposed to 1015 percent254—but it is far more significant than was at issue in Dole. For some
states, particularly those with smaller populations and extensive interstates,
federal highway funding actually approaches the funding levels seen in
Medicaid.255 NFIB did not evaluate the coerciveness of the Medicaid expansion
on a state-by-state basis, however, so the fact that federal highway funding
accounts for a different proportion of different states’ budgets does not appear
determinative.
As Bagenstos reads NFIB, the Supreme Court has adopted an “antileveraging principle” for assessing the constitutionality of federal spending
power statutes.256 That principle, as noted above, “provides that when Congress
takes an entrenched federal program that provides large sums to the states and
tells states they can continue to participate in that program only if they also agree
to participate in a separate and independent program, the condition is
unconstitutionally coercive.”257 Of particular concern and most vulnerable to
litigation are statutes that impose “cross-over conditions.”258 As both Bagenstos
and Ryan259 suggest, the CAA sanctions are cross-over conditions that “threaten
to ‘withdraw future funds provided under some specific preexisting grant
program’ if a state does not ‘enact some new federally mandated regulation.’”260
The federal highway program is a large, entrenched, preexisting program on
which states heavily rely, and, as Bagenstos acknowledges:
Insofar as they address stationary sources of pollution, the CAA’s
requirements would appear . . . to be separate and independent from the
highway-grant program. Those requirements do not govern how states
should construct and maintain highways. Nor do they govern the processes
251.
252.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (2012). The EPA may not cut off highway funds for projects necessary
to “resolve a demonstrated safety problem,” mass transit, carpooling programs, construction of highoccupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, “programs to limit or restrict vehicle use in downtown areas,” and other
programs that will “improve air quality and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle capacity.” §
7509(b)(1)(A), (B). In some jurisdictions, exempt funds will be a substantial portion of the available
highway funding. See Baake, supra note 20, at 8.
253. See NASBO, supra note 134.
254. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012).
255. See NASBO, supra note 134.
256. Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 864–65.
257. Id. at 865.
258. Id. at 906.
259. Ryan, supra note 20, at 1049 (“Because the CAA conditions the receipt of federal highway
funds on a state’s performance of CAA duties that are only indirectly related to those highway funds, it
comes closer than any other environmental law to the vulnerable crossover condition at the heart of the
Sebelius doctrine.”).
260. Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 916–17.
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by which states should choose which highways to construct and maintain.
And they do not even govern the use of the highways constructed or
maintained with federal funds.261

For Bagenstos, this marks the beginning of the coercion analysis. Courts
would then need to determine “whether the threatened cutoff of funds leaves
states with a prerogative to reject Congress’s desired policy, not merely in theory
but in fact.”262 This second analytical step looks to the amount of federal funds
threatened or at stake and, as Bagenstos notes, “it is conceptually difficult to
identify a point at which the amount of federal funds at stake is so great that a
state has no realistic option to refuse.”263 In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts also
declined to identify a point or draw that line, stating instead that “[i]t is enough
for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”264
Applying the anti-leveraging principle of NFIB to the CAA sanctions, Bagenstos
distinguishes the substantial but comparatively smaller highway grants,
concluding perhaps “[t]he threat to withhold federal highway funds thus may
well trigger the Chief Justice’s principle that sometimes sovereign states ‘have
to act like it.’”265 Nevertheless, he recognizes that legal challenges to the CAA
may raise serious questions under NFIB as it remains “unclear at exactly what
point a state should be understood to lack a real choice to refuse a federal grant,”
making it “impossible to predict precisely how courts will apply NFIB to the
CAA.”266
To date, only the D.C. Circuit has considered this question and applied
NFIB and the “coerciveness inquiry” to the CAA.267 In Mississippi Commission
on Environmental Quality v. EPA the court rejected a series of challenges to
various determinations made in the process of making nonattainment
determinations. Of particular relevance, the court rejected an attempt to
challenge the nonattainment designation of Wise County, Texas, on the grounds
that such designation is unconstitutional because the sanctions are
unconstitutionally coercive under NFIB.268 With a rather cursory (and somewhat
sloppy) analysis, the court rejected this claim, and even questioned the need to
make any “coerciveness inquiry” at all. 269
The petitioners in Mississippi Commission argued that “the [CAA]’s
sanctions for noncompliant states impose such a steep price that State officials
effectively have no choice but to comply—in contravention of the Supreme
Court’s decision in [NFIB].”270 Framing the question as purely one of federal
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 918–19.
Id. at 919 (internal citations omitted); see also Joondeph, supra note 13, at 834.
Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 919.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012).
Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 920 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603).
Id.
See Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 175–79 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 175.
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coercion following NFIB, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling focused almost exclusively
on the disparate amounts of money at issue in NFIB and the highway funds
threatened by the CAA. The principles outlined in Dole, and which underlie
current conditional spending jurisprudence, made scarcely any appearance at all.
The Mississippi Commission court assumed for the sake of its “coercion
analysis” that, as with the conditions at issue in Dole, the CAA sanctions are “not
a restriction on how the highway funds are to be used, but rather an incentive to
encourage States to take action in a related policy area.” 271 Thus, the court did
not engage in any meaningful consideration of whether the CAA was leveraging
participation in an entrenched program to persuade unwilling states to comply
with separate regulatory requirements or whether there was a sufficient
connection between the highway fund sanctions and the purposes of federal
highway spending.
The court gave two reasons for finding the CAA’s sanctions “not nearly as
coercive as those in the [PP]ACA.”272 First, the court found that “unlike the
situation in NFIB and like that in Dole, a noncompliant State does not risk losing
all federal funding for an existing program,” only funding for highway projects
in the nonattainment areas.273 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court
only cited CAA section 179, and completely ignored the EPA’s ability to apply
highway fund sanctions more broadly under section 110.274
Second, the court opined, even if the EPA withheld all $3 billion of Texas’s
highway funds for 2013, “it would still have amounted to less than 4 per cent of
the State’s 2013 budget.”275 Such a relatively small amount, “does not even
approach the ‘over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget’ at issue in NFIB.”276
Perhaps so, but it is still many times greater than the less than half of one percent
of South Dakota’s budget at issue in Dole, and nearly the amount of Medicaid
funding at stake for some states in NFIB. Nonetheless, the Mississippi
Commission court concluded that it was “clear that Texas does not risk losing
anywhere near the percentage of its federal funding—either for the program at
issue or of its overall budget—that the Court found fatal” when considering the
Medicaid provisions of the PPACA.277
Such a perfunctory “coercion” analysis suggests that the court did not
appreciate or take seriously NFIB’s anti-leveraging principle. Instead, the court
simply compared the federal dollars threatened by the two statutes and conclude
that the highway funds were not significant enough to constitute “coercion.” 278

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177–79.
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More troubling, however, are the Mississippi Commission court’s treatment
of Dole and misreading of the CAA. The per curiam opinion did not formally
apply the Dole factors as, according to the opinion, the petitioners had not argued
that the highway fund sanctions failed to satisfy “any other constitutional
requirements governing conditions on federal grants to the States.”279 The court
also questioned, albeit in dicta, whether Dole and the coerciveness inquiry was
even necessary.280 One reason for this was that the court understood section 179
not to withhold federal highway funds from noncompliant states, but merely to
“redirect” funds “to programs of the Congress’ choosing, including those that
‘would improve air quality and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle
capacity.’”281 This is a non sequitur based upon a misunderstanding. That the
funding at issue may be spent on some other program, somewhere else, in no
way lessens the burden placed upon the noncompliant state. In any event, the
court was simply confused about how the CAA actually operates.
To support its claim that section 179 “redirects,” rather than withholds,
funding for noncompliant states, the opinion cited a portion of the 1989 Senate
Report on the Senate version of the 1989 CAA Amendments concerning bill
language that was never enacted and is quite different from what is contained in
the U.S. Code.282
The CAA sanctions are not as the court described. The CAA’s broad
highway funds sanctions allow the EPA to “impose a prohibition . . . of any
projects or the awarding by the Secretary [of the Transportation] of any grants,
under Title 23 other than projects or grants for safety.”283 The Mississippi
Commission court cited a list of possible exceptions to the general prohibition on

279. Id. at 176 n.21 (noting petitioners “do not argue that the sanctions provision fails to comply
with any other constitutional requirements governing conditions on federal grants to the States” (citing
South Dakota v. Dole, 403 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987))).
280. Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 179 (“These differences from the Supreme Court’s precedents create
some uncertainty as to whether the coerciveness inquiry employed in Dole and NFIB was even triggered
by the [CAA] provisions at issue here.”).
281. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(viii) (2012)).
282. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 101–228, at 26 (1989)). The opinion repeatedly cites this report as
“Senate Committee Report on the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.” In fact, the report is actually titled
as a report on the CAA Amendments of 1989, which underwent substantial revision before being enacted
the following year. The court’s opinion asserts that this report “explains” the operation of section 179’s
sanction provisions. Yet the amendments considered by the Senate in 1989 did not contain any sanction
provisions in section 179. Rather, the proposed amendments contained combined provisions concerning
both conformity and sanctions in only section 176. As eventually enacted, the 1990 amendments added
separate conformity and sanction provisions in sections 176 and 179 respectively. See supra notes 111116 and accompanying text.
It is also worth noting that earlier in the opinion the court seemed to analyze the question
differently, stating: “In the case now before us, the Congress has conditioned some federal highway
funding on Texas’s adoption of an adequate implementation plan. This condition, like the one at issue in
Dole, is—at least arguably—not a restriction on how the highway funds are to be used, but rather an
incentive to encourage States to take action in a related policy area.” Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 177
(emphasis added).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A).
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Title 23 highway funds.284 These exceptions do not “redirect” highway funding
as the court suggested. Rather, they allow the Transportation Secretary to
continue funding these specific excepted highway programs notwithstanding the
EPA’s sanctions under the CAA.285 Thus, the court’s first attempt to distinguish
the CAA highway sanctions from Dole relied on a misreading of the sanctions.
The Mississippi Commission court’s second attempt to distinguish Dole and
excuse any need for a coerciveness inquiry focused on its assertion that, unlike
the conditions under the CAA, the “new” spending conditions imposed in Dole
and NFIB surprised the “‘participating States with post-acceptance or retroactive
conditions.’”286 The court distinguished Dole and NFIB by noting that “[n]either
the [CAA]’s requirement to submit an implementation plan, nor its highway
funds sanction, is a condition that has been newly imposed on the States.”287
Both have been on the books for decades.288 Because the highway funds sanction
came as no surprise to Texas, the court reasoned, it was not clear that “the
coerciveness inquiry employed in Dole and NFIB was even triggered by the
[CAA] provisions at issue here.”289 This reasoning misconstrues Dole and NFIB.
A threshold question in Dole and NFIB is whether Congress has exceeded
its spending power by imposing conditions that “threat[en] to terminate other
significant independent grants.”290 Thus, as we have discussed, one of the open
issues in NFIB was whether the PPACA’s “new” Medicaid program was actually
new and sufficiently distinct from “old” Medicaid so as to trigger a coerciveness
inquiry. But whether the states in Dole, NFIB, or Mississippi were “surprised” or
caught off guard by a grant condition does not by itself determine whether
Congress has exceeded its constitutional conditional spending authority. In cases
in which the conditions “threat[en] to terminate other significant independent
grants,” the Dole test is to be applied and a coerciveness inquiry conducted when
the spending conditions violate even one of the four elements of that test. 291
In Mississippi, the D.C. Circuit had presumed that that the CAA conditions
were “an incentive to encourage States to take action in a related policy area”—
a conclusion that should have triggered a Dole analysis.292 That is, having
determined that the threat to withhold federal highway funds was designed to
encourage states to comply with an environmental program, the court then should
have applied the four Dole factors. Instead, the Mississippi court’s dicta
suggested that because Texas had been a longtime recipient of the federal
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 178 (citing § 7509(b)(1)(A), (B)(i)–(viii)).
See § 7509(b)(1)(A), (B)(i)–(viii).
Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 179 (quoting NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012)).
Id.
Id. (“Although both were new in 1977, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.L. No.
95–95, §§ 103, 176, 91 Stat. 685, 687–88, 749–50 (1977), since then Texas has submitted implementation
plans and accepted billions of dollars in highway funding.”).
289. Id.
290. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
291. Id.
292. Mississippi, 790 F.3d at 177.

Adler Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017 12:55 PM

2016]

IS THE CLEAN AIR ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

713

highway funds, and because those funds had long been subject to the CAA
sanctions, those sanctions were not “new” or “surprising” to Texas and were
therefore unlikely to require a coerciveness inquiry. 293
After NFIB, many predicted that legal challenges to a variety of federal
environmental statutes would ensue. The Mississippi decision is not likely to be
the final word on the constitutionality of the CAA sanctions or even much of a
blueprint for how lower courts will apply NFIB or employ the “anti-leveraging
principle.” Indeed, federal courts should avoid Mississippi’s cursory analysis and
misreading of the CAA, and consider more carefully whether the CAA sanctions
“threat[en] to terminate other significant independent grants.” 294
In our view, given that the Court has so far declined to fix a line at which
pressure becomes coercion, the amount of money at issue should not be the
dispositive factor, but will likely affect the rigor with which courts apply the Dole
test. That is, if the amount of money threatened by a given statute is small, courts
may not look too carefully at the “notice” or “relatedness” prongs, but will
simply expect the states to act like independent sovereigns. As the amount in
jeopardy increases, however, so may the stringency with which courts scrutinize
the conditions. Thus, the NFIB Court showed a willingness to explore whether
the conditions are being applied retroactively, surprising the states, or really are
related to the purpose of the funding. This would explain why the Court found a
meaningful distinction between old and new Medicaid in NFIB, but might have
been less concerned about the relationship between drinking ages and highway
funding in Dole. As the amount of money and related reliance interests increase,
so too does the need to police the boundary between permissible encouragement
and impermissible coercion.
V.

COERCION BEYOND CONDITIONAL SPENDING

NFIB reinforced, and arguably expanded, the limitations on Congress’s use
of conditional spending to induce state participation in federal programs. As
discussed above, even a rather narrow reading of the NFIB holding raises serious
questions about the constitutionality of at least one extant federal environmental
program: the imposition of highway fund sanctions under section 179 of the
CAA. If one adopted a broader reading of NFIB, the consequences would be
broader as well.295

293.
294.
295.

Id. at 179.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
For examples of broader readings of NFIB’s conditional spending holding, see Elhauge, supra
note 174, at 545–53. For an argument that NFIB should have adopted a broader anti-coercion principle,
see Berman, supra note 17 at 1286–87. Narrower readings, such as those applied above, have been
characterized as “lawyerly . . . gutting” of NFIB. See Roderick Hills, Fair-Weather Friends of Federalism
(and Nationalism) in King v. Burwell? The Dilemma of Supporting Principles That Hurt One’s Cause,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 7, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/03/fair-weatherfriends-of-federalism-and-nationalism-in-king-v-burwell.html.
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NFIB itself concerned the use of conditional spending to induce state
cooperation. An obvious question, however, is whether the holding should be so
limited. If the underlying principle embodied in NFIB’s Medicaid holding is that
the federal government may not coerce states under the guise of offering mere
inducements, it is not clear why this principle should be limited to fiscal
inducements. Other levers of influence, such as conditional preemption, should
create no less risk of coercion, particularly if, as is the case with at least one CAA
provision, a state’s failure to cooperate results in the imposition of more stringent
regulatory requirements.296 On the other hand, the Court seemed to consider and
reject such arguments in New York, in the process of upholding conditional
regulations that threatened to impose highly disruptive conditions on private
industry in noncooperating states.297
Since NFIB, litigants have already challenged other aspects of the CAA,
alleging that the choices presented to state governments are no less coercive than
the threat of withholding desired and relied-upon federal funds. In one recent
case, for instance, Texas argued (unsuccessfully) that the threat of a FIP was
coercive.298 As of this writing, over two dozen states argue that the Obama
Administration’s ambitious Clean Power Plan (CPP) is unconstitutionally
coercive in that it leaves states no ability to opt out of participation in the control
of greenhouse gases from the utility sector. In this Part, we consider the CAA’s
offset sanction and the coercion challenges to the CPP.
A. Offsets
The failure to submit or maintain an adequate SIP to achieve the NAAQS
not only threatens the loss of highway funds, but can also trigger more stringent
regulatory requirements for stationary sources in the relevant jurisdiction. Under
the CAA, firms in nonattainment areas are required to make investments that
reduce emissions of the relevant air pollutants to “offset” any emission increases
resulting from the construction or modification of covered stationary sources.299
Where states fail to cooperate with the EPA by developing and implementing a
SIP of their own, the offset requirements increase.300 Specifically, section 179
provides that in applying the sanction emission offset requirements to stationary
sources, “the ratio of emission reductions to increased emissions shall be at least
2 to 1,”301 instead of the default 1.15 to 1 ratio otherwise provided for in the

296.
297.

42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(2) (2012).
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174 (1992) (“The affected States are not
compelled by Congress to regulate, because any burden caused by a State’s refusal to regulate will fall on
[private citizens], rather than on the State as a sovereign.”).
298. Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
299. § 7509(b)(2).
300. Id.
301. Id.
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CAA. Under existing EPA regulations, this offset requirement typically will be
imposed before a state risks losing its highway funds. 302
Offset provisions are generally used to ensure that additional economic
development does not come at the expense of emissions control. 303 By requiring
firms to offset capital investments that may increase emissions with equivalent
(or greater) emission reductions, such provisions allow firms to upgrade and
expand their facilities, so long as they do so in a way that does not increase
pollution. Offset provisions often require emission reductions greater than the
anticipated emission increases so as to account for potential leakage and
reinforce other emission controls that seek to reduce—rather than simply
maintain—existing emission levels.304
There is nothing particularly unusual or punitive about requiring firms to
offset expected emission increases with equal or greater emission reductions,
particularly where (as with nonattainment areas) the policy aim is to reduce
existing pollution levels. Without such provisions, permitting firms to construct
new facilities poses a risk of increasing pollution levels, particularly over
time.305 It may also make sense to increase the severity of offset requirements in
areas with worse air pollution, as is done in some CAA provisions, 306 as greater
offset requirements would align with greater emission reduction requirements.
Yet there does not appear to be any such rationale for increasing offset
requirements in states that fail to cooperate with federal regulatory initiatives
particularly where, as with the CAA, the federal government is prepared to step
in and impose the necessary regulatory controls itself. The existence of a FIP
alternative obviates the need for such requirements. Thus the CAA’s offset
sanction appears to be nothing more than a punishment imposed on recalcitrant
states as a means of pressure to cooperate. For this reason, the offset provisions
seem to raise the possibility of unconstitutional coercion.
NFIB did not address the problem of threatening more severe regulatory
burdens in states that refuse to cooperate with the implementation and execution
of a federal regulatory program. Such a problem was arguably raised in another
PPACA case, however. At oral argument in King v. Burwell, Justice Kennedy
suggested it would be unconstitutional to impose greater regulatory burdens in
states that refuse to implement a federal program. 307 Specifically, Justice
Kennedy suggested that the Court “wouldn’t allow” a law that, instead of
302.
303.

See 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(d) (2016).
For a discussion of offsets and their use under the CAA, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century
of Air Pollution Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549,
1627–30 (1991).
304. See id. at 1630 n.454.
305. All else equal, new and modified facilities may be expected to have longer useful lives than
older facilities, so the simple replacement of an older facility with a new one may result in an increase in
aggregate emissions over time.
306. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(b)(5), 7511a(c)(10), 7511a(d)(2) (2012).
307. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114), 2015
WL 2399405.
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withholding a portion of highway funding, threatened noncooperating states with
lower speed limits.308 This scenario is quite analogous to the CAA offset
sanction (if a bit more severe).309 It did not become part of the holding in King,
however, as the Court eschewed any reliance upon federalism-related arguments
in reaching its conclusion that the PPACA did not withhold tax credits for the
purchase of health insurance in states that refused to establish their own health
insurance exchanges.310
The Court may have avoided the federalism coercion argument in King
because of its potential to disrupt other federal regulatory programs. 311 Indeed,
the argument that imposing a differential regulatory burden in noncooperating
states runs headlong into New York, in which the Court concluded there was no
problem with Congress using its regulatory authority to encourage state
cooperation.312 Specifically, in New York, the Court held that Congress could
offer states the following deal: either implement federal policy (so as to ensure
local disposal capacity for low-level radioactive waste), or producers of such
waste (which include hospitals and medical research centers) will face more
costly disposal options and eventually be deprived of any ability to dispose of
their wastes.313 Given the volume of such wastes produced in many industries,
this was a particularly draconian condition, but one that the Court said was not
constitutionally problematic because the consequences of state inaction would
fall upon private actors rather than the state itself. As Justice O’Connor explained
in her opinion for the Court:
The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate, because any
burden caused by a State’s refusal to regulate will fall on those who generate
waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the State as a
sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act’s milestones

308. Id. (“In South [Dakota] v. Dole where . . . the matter of funding for the highway, suppose
Congress said, and if you don’t build the highways, you have to go 35 miles an hour all over the State.
We wouldn’t allow that.”). This hypothetical appears to have been inspired by an amicus brief focusing
on federalism arguments in support of the federal government’s position in King. Brief of Jewish All. for
Law & Soc. Action (JALSA) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480 (2015) (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 350366, at *27.
309. The federal government has proposed lowering speed limits to achieve environmental
regulatory goals. See 151 Cong. Rec. H8537-02, 2005 WL 2397286; Dick Feagler, Cloning the Key to
Calm in Flitting Flower Fly Furor, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER (March 3, 1997), 1997 WLNR 6322757; Andy
McCue, The Press-Enterprise, Riverside, Calif., Andy McCue Column, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE,
Riverside, Calif., (July 27, 2001), 2001 WLNR 7665403 (“Developers still talk of the government
bureaucrat who proposed that the state limit traffic on I-10 to 20 miles an hour during the mating season,
when the fly would want to migrate across the already existing freeway.”).
310. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective
Contextualism, 15 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 51–52 (2015) (noting the Court’s failure to address federalism
concerns in King v. Burwell).
311. See Jonathan H. Adler, Could King v. Burwell Overturn Parts of New York v. United States?,
WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/05/
could-king-v-burwell-overturn-parts-of-new-york-v-united-states/.
312. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166–67 (1992).
313. Id. at 174.
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may devote its attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more
worthy; the choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, not
with Congress. The State need not expend any funds, or participate in any
federal program, if local residents do not view such expenditures or
participation as worthwhile.314

This language would seem to allow for the constitutionality of the CAA’s offset
provisions. Although these provisions may seem punitive—and, as a
consequence somewhat coercive, they impose the additional burden on private
citizens rather than upon the states themselves.
If Congress’s use of incentives poses a risk of coercion, there is no logical
reason for subjecting conditions placed upon the receipt of federal spending to
greater scrutiny than the potentially punitive use of conditional preemption. At
least in theory, either poses the potential of presenting states with an offer they
cannot refuse—the proverbial “gun to the head.” If, in the conditional spending
context, leveraging state reliance upon federal funds is suspect, then there are
reasons to suspect equivalent leveraging in the context of conditional
preemption. New York, however, clearly rejects such concerns on formalist
grounds. So long as the threatened burden is borne by private actors, as opposed
to the state itself, the New York Court saw no threat to state sovereign interests.
Unless the Court were willing to revisit this analysis—perhaps by revisiting the
formalist distinction between burdens placed upon states-as-states and burdens
placed upon private interests within states—it is hard to see how a coercionbased challenge to the offset sanctions would gain much traction.
B. The Clean Power Plan
NFIB-based coercion arguments feature prominently in attacks on the
lawfulness of the EPA’s CPP.315 The CPP is a set of regulations implemented
under section 111 of the CAA, which authorizes the issuance of standards of
performance for new and existing sources.316 The central piece of the CPP
imposes emission reduction obligations on existing power plants—those that are
314.
315.

Id.
See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., Does EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposal Violate the States’
Sovereign Rights?, 16 ENGAGE 36, 42 (2015). Laurence H. Tribe, Tribe: Why EPA’s Climate Plan Is
Unconstitutional, HARV. L. TODAY (Mar. 20, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/why-epa-climate-planis-unconstitutional/; HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
POWER, EPA’S PROPOSED 111(D) RULE FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS: LEGAL AND COST ISSUES:
TESTIMONY OF LAURENCE H. TRIBE 26 (March 17, 2015), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
IF/IF03/20150317/103073/HHRG-114-IF03-Wstate-TribeL-20150317-U1.pdf (“EPA’s proposal puts a
gun to every state’s head.”); Laurence H. Tribe, The Clean Power Plan Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 22, 2014, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/laurence-tribe-the-epas-clean-power-plan-isunconstitutional-1419293203; Laurence H. Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., Comment Letter on 79 Fed.
Reg. 34,830, at 32 (Dec. 1, 2014) http://www.masseygail.com/pdf/Tribe-Peabody_111(d)_Comments_
(filed).pdf (“The Proposed Rule invades state regulatory control in an unprecedented manner under the
[CAA] and raises grave constitutional questions. It seeks to commandeer state agencies in violation of
core structural principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment.”).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012).
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in operation and emitting GHGs. Under section 111(d), the EPA identifies the
“Best System of Emission Reduction” that has been “adequately demonstrated”
for a given source category—this becomes the standard of performance that
existing sources must meet.317 States are then expected to develop SIPs that will
ensure sources within each state will meet the emission targets. The goal of the
plan is to reduce power plant emissions by 32 percent (below 2005 levels) by
2030.318 This goal is significant because power plants are responsible for the
lion’s share of GHG emissions (approximately one-third).319 Under the CPP,
states are supposed to begin making reductions in 2022 with an ultimate
compliance date of 2030. This date may seem like a long way off, but given the
nature of utility investments, it is generally recognized that utilities would have
to begin making investments in compliance within the next year or so in order to
meet the targets.320 Industry and the challenging states stressed this in their stay
applications with the Court.321
The CPP gives states substantial flexibility in how they decide to meet the
required emission reductions. Among other things, the EPA hopes that states will
rely to some degree on energy efficiency and conservation investments and
emission trading to reduce the costs of compliance.322 Despite the EPA’s
promised flexibility, some states have indicated that they do not plan to cooperate
(much as many states refused to cooperate with the PPACA and refused to create
exchanges). Should states refuse to develop their own SIPs, however, the EPA
has the authority to impose a FIP to achieve the same level of emission
reductions, just as it has under other provisions of the CAA. A FIP, however, is
unlikely to be as flexible as a SIP could be.
The emission reductions targeted by the CPP are based upon a set of
“building blocks” identified by the EPA. Specifically, the EPA assumes that
states may achieve the required emission reductions through (1) heat rate
improvements at individual plants, (2) increased use of natural gas instead of
coal for electricity generation, and (3) increased use of renewable energy. 323 The
317.
318.

§ 7411(d).
See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,924 tbls.15 & 16 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
319. See id. at 64,689 (fossil fuel-fired power plants generate approximately 38 percent of all
domestic, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions).
320. See generally James W. Coleman, Investing in the Shadow of the Law: How Agencies Are Using
Proposed Rules to Transform Industry Long Before Final Rules Are Tested In Court, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016).
321. See, e.g., Application by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency
Action During Pendency of Petitions for Review at 43–44, West Virginia v. EPA (No. 15A773),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2016.01.26_wv_et_al._scotus_stay_application.pdf. On
February 9, 2016, a divided Supreme Court voted 5-4 to grant a stay of the CPP pending resolution of
pending legal challenges to the EPA’s rules. See Order Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct.
1000 (2016).
322. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,710 (noting that the CPP does not require that states adopt the specific
emission reduction measures identified by the EPA).
323. See id. at 64,667.
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EPA also hopes that states will also use their SIPs to encourage energy
conservation and increased efficiency, although the EPA could not impose such
measures directly under a FIP.324 The ultimate level of emission reductions
required under the CPP is greater than can be achieved by merely imposing
emission controls on existing fossil-fuel fired power plants, and will require
regulated sources to achieve emission reductions by displacing existing fossil
fuel electricity production with natural gas, renewable energy, energy
conservation, or some combination thereof.325 These changes, in turn, will
inevitably make work for state policy makers as well.
Twenty-six states filed suit challenging the CPP in federal court.326 Among
other things, these states (and their industry allies) argued that the CPP both
commandeers state governments and is coercive under NFIB because it
effectively forces states to participate in the federal government’s regulatory
regime and offers states no ability to withhold their cooperation.327 Whether or
not a state adopts a SIP to implement the CPP, state public utility commissions
and other officials will be required to takes steps to ensure that power continues
to flow within the state.328 Failure to cooperate is not an option. Should a state
refuse to enact a SIP to implement the CPP, the substitute FIP would still require
state cooperation in order for it to be effective without compromising the
reliability of the electricity supply.329 If, for instance, sources in a given state
seek to comply with a FIP by reducing reliance upon coal and increasing natural
gas capacity, this would require the approval and cooperation of state regulators,
and should state regulators refuse to comply, the state would risk severe
consequences in the form of an unreliable electricity supply.
As with arguments targeting the offset provisions, the arguments against the
CPP also seem precluded by the Court’s holding in New York—even more so. In
the offset context, noncooperating states are explicitly subject to more stringent
regulatory burdens—the precise scenario suggested by Justice Kennedy in the
King oral argument. With the CPP, however, it is not clear that the regulatory
burden faced by electricity producers (and, by extension, state citizens) is any
more severe in noncooperating states than in those that adopt SIPs of their own.

324.
325.
326.

See id. at 64,835–37.
See id. at 64,666–67.
An additional eighteen states support the CPP. See Robin Bravender, 44 States Take Sides in
Expanding Legal Brawl, GREENWIRE (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060027463.
327. Joint Brief for the Petitioner at 78–85, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19,
2016).
328. Id. at 82 (“A federal plan’s mandate to retire coal-fired plants or reduce their utilization
(including by requiring the purchase of emissions allowances) would force state utility and electricity
regulators to respond in the same way as if the State itself had ordered the retirements.”).
329. Id. at 20 (“Because no regulated unit can achieve the Rule’s uniform performance rates, States
will be required even under federal plans to facilitate the reordering of each State’s mix of electricity
generation in order to ‘ensure that electric system reliability will be maintained’ as coal generation is
forced to retire and alternative generation must be constructed to take its place.” (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at
64,981)).
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In either case, the CPP imposes an extensive range of costly emission reduction
requirements with the aim of restructuring electricity markets.
The stakes involved in the CPP may be higher than in other conditional
preemption contexts, but it is not clear why the principle is any different. Further,
unlike with the offset provisions, the EPA is not imposing greater regulatory
burdens on noncooperating states. Insofar as a FIP is more costly or onerous for
in-state industries than a SIP, this is due to the fact that states have a broader
range of regulatory (and other) tools at their disposal, not because the CAA
imposes sanctions on noncooperation.330 The ultimate degree of emission
reductions required is the same under either a SIP or a FIP. If the EPA’s CPP
regulations are authorized by the CAA,331 then the choice presented to states is
equivalent to that offered in most conditional preemption contexts: adopt
regulations that achieve the federally mandated goals or be subject to duly
authorized federal regulations that will achieve this goal.
CPP opponents have argued that the regulations adopted by the EPA are
nonetheless coercive because states will be required to facilitate even federal
regulation of greenhouse gases from utilities, and the states have no practical
choice but to cooperate. This is because implementation of the CPP—whether
performed by federal or state officials—will force the closure of coal-fired power
plants. As a consequence, state public utility commissions will need to facilitate
the siting of alternative power sources in order to ensure an adequate and reliable
electricity supply within the state.332 This facilitation, opponents claim, amounts
to unconstitutional commandeering, and the CPP is coercive because the states
are left without any choice but to cooperate in this fashion.
There is no doubt that state policy makers will feel tremendous pressure to
ensure that electricity supply and reliability are unaffected by the imposition of
330. There is some ambiguity as to whether the EPA could impose highway fund sanctions under
section 179 for a state’s failure to adopt a compliant SIP to implement section 111 requirements, but the
EPA has made clear that it does not believe such sanctions are available. See Jean Chemnick, Agency
Won’t Withhold Highway Funds for Clean Power Plan – McCarthy, E&E NEWS PM, (Mar. 30, 2015)
http://cache-ashburn-01.eenews.net/eenewspm/2015/03/30/stories/1060016017.
331. The majority of the arguments against the lawfulness of the CPP concern whether the EPA has
the authority to impose such regulations on existing power plants under section 111(d) of the CAA. In
addition, there is an argument that the potential disruption of state-level electricity markets and
displacement of state regulatory authority is a factor that courts should consider when interpreting section
111(d). Such arguments depend upon the canon of construction that instructs courts to interpret statutes
so as not to interfere with traditional areas of state authority and is not dependent upon a conclusion that
the CPP itself would constitute unconstitutional coercion if otherwise constitutional.
332. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Andrew M. Grossman, ‘Clean Power’ Plays and the Last Stand for
Federalism: What Will Be Left of Our Constitutional Order if the EPA’s Plan Passes Judicial Muster?,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2016, 6:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/clean-power-plays-and-the-laststand-for-federalism-1474841482 (“[T]his is how the plan works: The EPA pushes coal-fired plants off
the grid, and then counts on the states to ensure that the resulting reductions in capacity are matched by
increases in EPA-preferred forms of power generation. State agencies will have to be involved in
decommissioning coal-fired plants, addressing replacement capacity—like wind turbines and solar
arrays—addressing transmission and integration issues, and undertaking all manner of related regulatory
proceedings. All this to carry out federal policy.”).
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stringent emission controls on the power sector. In this regard, however, the CPP
is no different in kind than any other CAA regulation of utility emissions,
including recently imposed controls on mercury emissions or the interstate
emissions of ozone precursors. All such regulation has the potential to result in
the closure of older, higher-emitting facilities (coal-fired power plants in
particular) and any such closures present state policy makers with a choice of
either facilitating the siting and development of alternatives or risking a less
reliable electricity supply. More broadly, all manner of environmental (and
other) regulation of private economic activities may generate secondary effects
that prompt state and local governments to respond. None of this constitutes
commandeering, and the existence of such consequences does not “coerce” the
states as coercion is understood under Dole and NFIB. To hold that the CPP is
coercive because the federal regulation of utilities may create problems that state
regulators must address would effectively proscribe any meaningful federal
regulation of utilities. Such a rule would not only eviscerate the long-standing
practice of cooperative federalism under the CAA, it would threaten the use of
conditional preemption throughout the U.S. Code.
The CPP may represent a more expansive assertion of federal regulatory
authority than was involved in New York, but the differences are of degree, not
of kind. In New York, the Supreme Court expressly blessed the use of conditional
preemption where the imposition of federal regulation has the potential to create
problems that state policy makers will feel compelled to address. New York
opposed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act in no small
part because state policy makers feared the federal regulatory measures would
induce a low-level radioactive waste disposal crisis within the state. No matter.
The use of conditional preemption to prod state cooperation was upheld. Only
the effort to “commandeer” state policy makers through the take-title provision
was invalidated. By the same token, were the EPA to attempt to require states to
regulate utility emissions themselves, there would be a commandeering problem,
but there is no such problem under New York merely because federal regulatory
measures may have local effects to which some states object.
CONCLUSION
NFIB may have saved the individual mandate and the rest of the PPACA,
but it also may have imperiled portions of the CAA. The seven-Justice majority
appears to undermine the CAA’s sanctions regime, curtailing Congress’s ability
to threaten withholding substantial federal moneys in order to induce state
cooperation with federal programs. If any other provision of federal law is
coercive under the NFIB Court’s rationale, it is likely section 179 of the CAA.
Although NFIB itself was confined to the question of conditional spending,
the Court’s willingness to find coercion within the PPACA’s choice architecture
opens the door to coercion arguments in other contexts. This creates an opening
for challenges to other parts of the CAA, including the offset provisions and the
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CPP, though such challenges would require a further expansion of the anticoercion doctrine in order to be successful. To date, the Court has not indicated
any willingness to second guess the wide berth given to conditional preemption
under New York.
The CAA’s highway fund sanctions may be constitutionally suspect after
NFIB, but conditional spending requirements under other federal environmental
statutes appear to be far less vulnerable. At present, most other federal
environmental statutes simply impose conditions on how funding for state-level
environmental programs is to be spent or do no more than threaten conditional
preemption.333 Nonetheless, the Court’s willingness to accept a coercion-based
argument against the use of conditional spending creates opportunities to alter
the entire landscape of this doctrine.

333.

Ryan, supra note 20, at 1039–49.
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